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I. INT RODUCT ION

Should the United States of America have a constitutional
convention? Although the Constitution of the United States of America
has been exceptional in most respects over the course of its journey, it has
required substantial modification throughout the various epochs in
American history. Today, a significant group of prominent scholars, led
by Sanford Levinson, repeatedly call for a second constitutional
convention. 1 Other scholars have purported to demonstrate the U.S.
Constitution’s declining influence around the world. 2 Even Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg is on record stating, “I would not look to the U.S.
Constitution if I were drafting a constitution in the year 2012.” 3 These
insights suggest improvements might be made.
According to Professor Levinson, “[w]e need a new constitutional
convention, one that could engage in a comprehensive overview of the
U.S. Constitution and the utility of many of its provisions to twenty-first
century Americans.” 4 Chief among Levinson’s criticism is the rigid nature
of Article V, which “makes it functionally impossible to amend the
Constitution with regard to anything truly important.” 5 For Levinson, a
convention would, among other things, provide a vehicle for

1. See, e.g., S ANFORD LEVINSON, F RAMED: AMERICA’ S 51 C ONSTITUTIONS AND THE C RISIS
GOVERNANCE 391 (2012); S ANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC C ONSTITUTION: W HERE
THE C ONSTITUTION W ENT WRONG (AND HOW WE THE P EOPLE C AN C ORRECT IT) 11 (2006); see also
LARRY S ABATO, A MORE P ERFECT C ONSTITUTION (2007); Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost (Nov.
16, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ik1AK56FtVc [https://perma.cc/DSD8-7K92];
America’s Constitution: If It Ain’t Broke, T HE ECONOMIST (Nov. 8, 2007),
http://www.economist.com/node/10097645 [https://perma.cc/E2CK-NQ5J] (referencing quotes by
Larry Sabato).
2. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 762 (2012).
3. Id.; The Middle East Media Research Institute TV Monitor Project, U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Egyptians: Look to the Constitutions of South Africa or Canada, Not
to the U.S. Constitution, MEMRI TV (Jan. 30, 2012), https://www.memri.org/tv/us-supreme-courtjustice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-egyptians-look-constitutions-south-africa-or-canada
[https://perma.cc/RL67-42SS].
4. LEVINSON (2012), supra note 1, at 391.
5. Id. at 338.
OF
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comprehensive constitutional revision, including of Article V itself, which
he deems desirable.
None other than Thomas Jefferson would agree. Jefferson was a
notable proponent of the idea that constitutions should expire at the end
of each generation, because the earth belongs to the living and the dead
should not bind the living. James Madison famously disagreed with
Jefferson’s proposal, deeming stability in a constitution and its various
effects to be of primary practical importance over Jefferson’s theoretical
objections. 6 Moreover, Madison argued that Article V struck the
appropriate mean between two problematic extremes of immutable
rigidity and facile mutability. 7
Their rich exchange did not end this fascinating debate—it continued
on the floor of state constitutional conventions myriad times over the
course of American constitutional history. 8 As one scholar noted,
“[a]lthough we usually think of Madison’s vision as victorious and
Jefferson’s advice as unheeded, this myth is largely the result of our
scholarly emphasis on the U.S. Constitution.” 9 Indeed, 18 states have, at
various points, included in their constitutions provisions mandating either
the holding of a future constitutional convention at a specified time or the
requirement that the question whether to hold a convention be submitted
to the people for referendums. Fourteen states continue to submit this
question to the people at regular, periodic intervals; New York submitted
the question on the ballot in November 2017. 10

6. This is an introductory simplification of their more robust positions, which I flesh out in
Part II.
7. See T HE F EDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (Article V “ guards equally against that
extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which
might perpetuate its discovered faults.”).
8. Many distinguished scholars have also considered this and related questions of
constitutional precommitment in great theoretical depth. See, e.g., C ASS R. S UNSTEIN, DESIGNING
DEMOCRACY: W HAT C ONSTITUTIONS DO (2001); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: S TUDIES IN
R ATIONALITY, P RECOMMITMENT, AND C ONSTRAINTS (2000); Jeremy Waldron, Disagreement and
Precommitment, in LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 254 (1999); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the
Paradox of Democracy, in C ONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (ELSTER, JON & S LAGSTAD,
R UNE, eds.) (1988).
9. LAURA J. S CALIA, AMERICA’ S JEFFERSONIAN EXPERIMENT: R EMAKING S TATE
C ONSTITUTIONS 1820–1850 5 (1999).
10. See Jesse McKinley, New York Voters Reject A Constitutional Convention, N.Y. T IMES
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/nyregion/new-york-state-constitutionalconvention.html [https://perma.cc/Z9TT-XJYN]; Eleonora Bottini, Who Is Afraid of the
Constitutional Convention? The Rejection of Constitutional Change in the State of New York, ICONNECT B LOG (Nov. 22, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/11/who-is-afraid-of-t h econstitutional-convention-the-rejection-of-constitutional-change-in-the-state-o f-new-yo rk
[https://perma.cc/T3NS-4EGV] (The measure was resoundingly defeated).
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Several scholars have written on this fascinating aspect of state
constitutional history, 11 but none to my knowledge have studied
intensively the debates on this issue across the various state conventions. 12
In this article, I begin that project. But why do so? Considering these
automatic question provisions, Professor Levinson asks whether it is “a
source of pride or lament that the U.S. Constitution includes no such
provision?” 13 False dichotomy aside, the question is worthy of reflection.
States are often heralded the “laboratories of democracy.”14 State
constitutions, then, provide interesting “visions of potential federal
reform,” insofar as they diverge from the federal Constitution. 15 Because
state constitutions share so strongly in the basic American model of
republican government embodied in the federal Constitution, they may be
more apt sources of comparative constitutional study with an eye to
improving the federal constitution than a foreign source that does not
share in many of these same basic norms. 16 State theory and practice,
therefore, may inform federal theory and practice. 17

11. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, Evolving State Constitutional Processes of Adoption,
Revision, and Amendment: The Path Ahead, 69 ARK. L. R EV. 553, 569–70 (2016); John Dinan, The
Political Dynamics of Mandatory State Constitutional Convention Referendums: Lessons from the
2000s Regarding Obstacles and Pathways to Their Passage, 71 MONT. L. R EV. 395, 399 (2010);
Robert J. Martineau, The Mandatory Referendum on Calling a State Constitutional Convention:
Enforcing the People’s Right to Reform Their Government, 31 OHIO S T. L.J. 421, 455 (1970). See
also JOHN DINAN, T HE AMERICAN S TATE C ONSTITUTIONAL T RADITION (2006); W ALTER F. DODD,
T HE R EVISION AND AMENDMENT OF S TATE C ONSTITUTIONS 48–54 (1970).
12. Authors have examined the debates on this issue at particular conventions. See, e.g., Amy
K. Trask, A History of Revision: The Constitutional Convention Question in Hawai’i, 1950-2008, 31
U. HAW . L. R EV. 291, 300 (2008). Professor Dinan examined several of the twentieth century
convention debates in brief in his wonderful book State Constitutional Tradition (2006). DINAN,
supra note 11, at 58. No one, to my knowledge, has undertaken the full comparative examination at
the level of depth that is the subject of this paper.
13. LEVINSON, supra note 1 at 343 (2012).
14. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“ It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”).
15. AKHIL R. AMAR, AMERICA’ S UNWRITTEN C ONSTITUTION: T HE P RECEDENTS AND
P RINCIPLES W E LIVE B Y 463, 467 (2012) [hereinafter AMAR II] (“ [C]ertain proposals to amend the
federal Constitution will be taken seriously if comparable proposals have already been adopted and
road-tested at the state level.”).
16. See id. at 466 (“ [T]his Basic American Model defines the boundaries of realistic
constitutional reform in America. Proposed federal amendments based on state variations within the
Basic American Model described above are much more likely to be taken seriously than amendment
proposals originating outside of this Basic American Model—proposals that are apt to be viewed as
“ foreign,” “ alien,” or “ un-American.”).
17. Id. at 467 (“ [C]ertain proposals to amend the federal Constitution will be taken seriously if
comparable proposals have already been adopted and road-tested at the state level.”).
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In 1787, James Bryce observed that “[i]t has been truly said that
nearly every provision of the federal Constitution that has worked well is
one borrowed from or suggested by some state constitution; nearly every
provision that has worked badly is one which the Convention, for want of
a precedent, was obliged to devise for itself.” 18 Further, states
reconsidering their own fundamental law undoubtedly benefit from the
study of other state practices. Thus, in considering ways to address in
American constitutional practice what has been termed the “paradox of
democracy” 19 —whether the dead may bind the living—states that have
done so through these “automatic question” 20 provisions are a rich and
invaluable resource for study.
The goal of this work is neither to embark on an empirical
investigation of the operation of these provisions in state constitutional
practice nor to advance a normative argument in support of either side.
Rather, I seek to explore descriptively and analytically the debate between
Jefferson and Madison as it has been extended, developed, and refined in
American constitutional practice. Many distinguished scholars have
considered this and related questions of constitutional precommitment in
great theoretical depth at a conceptual level. 21 Their studies are
illuminating and inform this work. My focus here, however, is the debate
in constitutional practice: I investigate the arguments advanced by
political actors within the context of constitutional conventions in the
American constitutional tradition, with all the biases, interests, and
passions that context entails.
A professor of the state constitutional tradition, John Dinan, has
claimed with respect to twentieth-century constitution-makers adopting
these provisions that “the resulting debates generally serv[ed] as a reprise
of the exchange between Jefferson and Madison on the issue.” 22 Although
true to some extent, the debates in the state conventions both built on the
considerations of Jefferson and Madison and pressed far beyond the points
those two had considered. The state debates raised new issues attendant
to this question in both theory and practice.
18. 1 JAMES B RYCE, T HE AMERICAN C OMMONWEALTH 31 (1889). I am indebted to Jon Elster
for this reference.
19. ELSTER, supra note 8, at 115; JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE S IRENS 93 (1984).
20. I refer to these provisions largely as “ automatic question” provisions throughout this work
for ease of use. In a certain sense, “ mandatory” rather than “ automatic” may be the appropriate
adjective, because some state formulations depend on the legislature to initiate the vote and conven e
the convention. Nevertheless, I find “ automatic question” to be easier on the reader.
21. See, e.g., S UNSTEIN, supra note 8; ELSTER, supra note 8; Waldron, supra note 8; Holmes,
supra note 8.
22. DINAN, supra note 11, at 58.
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The central thesis here is just that: the debates in state conventions
pushed beyond the scope of the debate between Jefferson and Madison
and we have much to learn from their discussions—both in their
examination of themes raised by Jefferson and Madison and in their
raising of new issues. My aims here are primarily descriptive and analytic,
rather than normative or explanatory. I seek to expand the spectrum of
voices contributing to this rich debate that echoes and endures across the
American Constitutional tradition. As Akhil Amar notes, “America’s
Constitution deserves careful study and still has much to teach us, if we
would but listen.” 23 The same must be said for the American state
constitutional tradition—state constitutions and their conventions are a
rich, ongoing source in the tradition of American constitutionalism,
particularly on this enduring question.
Accordingly, in Part II, I examine the genesis of the debate between
Jefferson and Madison over whether to adopt a procedural
precommitment to regular, periodic constitutional conventions. In Part III,
I provide a brief overview of the states that have adopted such provisions
and provide some context to the state constitutional landscape on this
question. In Part IV, I examine the central debates on this issue among the
various conventions at which it was considered. 24 Finally, I offer some
concluding remarks and observations.
II. FRAMING T HE DEBAT E: T HE J EFFERSON–MADISON EXCHANGE
As the debate between Jefferson and Madison merely sets the stage
for the substance of this work, my treatment here will not exhaust the
depths of this very rich exchange that challenges several of the
fundamental principles of constitutionalism. More comprehensive
treatments are available. 25 The Jefferson–Madison debate is, however, the
quintessential exchange on the issue at the heart of this work and did
inform a number of the state convention debates on the topic. Thus, an
examination of their arguments is in order.
I start with Jefferson’s first prominent letter to Madison on the issue,
move to Madison’s rebuttal letter along with Madison’s prior thought in
the Federalist, and conclude this section with Jefferson’s later letter

23. AKHIL R. AMAR, AMERICA’ S C ONSTITUTION: A B IOGRAPHY 471 (2006) [hereinaft er
AMAR I].
24. The conventions considered in this work are those of states in which such provisions have
been adopted. A point of further research would be to investigate which state conventions considered,
but never adopted, such provisions and the debates that ensued therein.
25. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 8.
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reiterating his position with the benefit of reflection from “forty years’
experience in government.” 26
A.

Jefferson’s Letter in Support of the Doctrine of Periodic Revision

Thomas Jefferson’s formulation of the idea to consider the revision
and amendment of constitutions at regular periodic intervals appeared
prominently in his letter to James Madison of September 6, 1789, on the
topic of “whether the earth belongs to the living.” 27 Other political
thinkers, such as Thomas Paine, 28 had expressed similar sentiments
against the binding of majority will, but a full articulation of the idea to
utilize periodic constitutional conventions as a corrective for that tension
appears to have arisen with Jefferson. 29 Jefferson had also referenced the
idea in his Notes on the State of Virginia, but his September 1789 letter to
Madison was his first full exposition of the doctrine.
In that letter, Jefferson took up “[t]he question Whether one
generation of men has a right to bind another.” 30 He noted that “it is a
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816) in T HE P ORTABLE
T HOMAS JEFFERSON 559 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). I faced the question whether to organize this
section conceptually or more chronologically. I opted for the latter, as it provides the benefit o f
considering the thinker’s positions over time and adds a bit of dramatic flair by providing a sense o f
the exchange as it occurred.
27. 1 T HE R EPUBLIC OF LETTERS: T HE C ORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN JEFFERSON AND
MADISON 1776–1826, 632 (James M. Smith ed., 1995). Notably, Jefferson did not send the letter to
Madison until January 9, 1790, almost two and one-half years after the conclusion of the Philadelphia
Convention and when all states but Rhode Island had ratified the Constitution, rendering the
Constitution effective. See U.S. C ONST. art. VII.
28. See generally T HOMAS P AINE, C OMMON S ENSE (1776). Paine’s fullest articulation of the
idea came in his Rights of Man, which he published in 1791, after Jefferson’s 1789 Letter. See
T HOMAS P AINE, R IGHTS OF MAN ((“ [A]s government is for the living, and not for the dead, it is the
living only that has any right to it.”). James Wilson also expressed related sentiments in peons to
popular sovereignty. AMAR I, supra note 23, at 297 (“ The people may change the
constitution[]whenever and however they please. This is a right of which no positive institution can
ever deprive them. . . . A majority of the society is sufficient for this purpose.”).
29. At least two pieces of evidence demonstrate that Jefferson had thought deeply on this topic.
First, he drafted the September 6, 1789 letter as a means to articulate his idea without any immediate
intention to send it to Madison, as he wrote:
I sit down to write to you without knowing by what occasion I shall send my letter. I do it
because a subject comes into my head which I would wish to develop a little more than is
practicable in the hurry of the moment of making up general dispatches.
Smith, supra note 27, at 631. Next, in the January 9, 1790 cover letter with which Jefferson sent the
pivotal letter to Madison, he noted his continued rumination, writing: “ [a]fter so long lying by me,
and further turning the subject in my mind, I find no occasion to alter my mind. I hazard it therefore
to your consideration.” Id. at 648. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that, earlier in 1789,
Jefferson had tried to persuade Marquis de Lafayette to include a principle about the “ rights of
succeeding generations” in his draft of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. See id. at 631 n.35.
30. Id. at 631–32.
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question of such consequences as not only to merit decision, but place
also, among the fundamental principles of every government.” 31 Jefferson
thought that this principle was “capable of proof” and he set out to do so. 32
The fundamental premise of Jefferson’s argument was “‘that the
earth belongs in usufruct to the living’: that the dead have neither powers
nor rights over it.” 33 Jefferson grounded this idea in his conception of
unoccupied land as held in common by society such that it reverted to the
living upon the death of the prior possessor. 34 The succession laws,
Jefferson noted, were positive rather than natural in character and, thus,
were determined by society. He wrote that “no man can, by natural right,
oblige the lands he occupied, or the persons who succeed him in that
occupation, to the paiment [sic] of debts contracted by him.” 35
From here, Jefferson risked the fallacy of composition by stating that
“[w]hat is true of every member of the society individually, is true of them
all collectively since the rights of the whole can be no more than the sum
of the rights of the individuals.” 36 To demonstrate the applicability of his
idea that the earth belongs to the living as a political community, Jefferson
relied on actuarial tables to estimate the length of each particular
generation, which he calculated at around 19 years. At this interval, each
generation “would . . . come on, and go off the stage at a fixed moment,
as individuals do now.” 37 No generation, then, could “contract debts
greater than may be paid during the course of it’s [sic] own existence,”

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 632.
Id.
Id.
Here, among other places, Jefferson likely owes a debt to Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, S ECOND
T REATISE ON GOVERNMENT, ch. V, § 27 (“ [T]he earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all
men . . . .”).
35. Smith, supra note 27, at 632. Jefferson continued: “ For if he could, he might, during his
own life, eat up the usufruct of the lands for several generations to come, and then the lands would
belong to the dead, and not to the living, which would be the reverse of our principle.” Id. at 632. In
ultimate irony, Jefferson died in substantial debt that was born by his grandson, Jefferson Randolph,
for much of his life. Thankfully, we need not appraise the merit of an idea on the consistent practice
of its originator, given Jefferson’s penchant for binding posterity in his personal life.
36. Id. at 632–33. Although such inferences are fertile grounds for error, political theorists
have utilized arguments of composition and division for the political community vis-à-vis individuals
since the inception of the field. See, e.g., P LATO, R EPUBLIC. Indeed, Jefferson did note some “ material
difference . . . between the succession of an individual, and that of a whole generation,” namely that
individuals are subject to the succession and inheritance laws of the whole society. S MITH, supra note
29, at 632–33. Here, however, he neglects to consider whether his argument may be extended, in the
same way, such that a generation should be subject to the constitutional constraints of the whole polity
or “ people” across time.
37. Id. at 632.
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because “the earth belongs to each of these generations, during it’s [sic]
course, fully, and in their own right.” 38
Crucial to the considerations of this article, Jefferson then argued that
his conception of each generation’s right to the unencumbered use of the
land applied to the fundamental political order of society:
On a similar ground it may be proved that no society can make a
perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always
to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds
from it, as they please, during their usufruct. . . . The constitution and
the laws of their predecessors extinguished then in their natural course
with those who gave them being. This could preserve that being till it
ceased to be itself, and no longer. Every constitution then, and every
law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer,
it is an act of force, and not of right. 39

Thus, for Jefferson, because the members of the deceased generation have
no natural right beyond their deaths to bind posterity, each generation’s
positive laws and constitutions must expire with them as well, as the
constitution’s legitimating source has ceased to be. That legitimating
source is the consent of the people who are the very font of the constituent
power. 40
Anticipating a critique, Jefferson considered whether the succeeding
generation’s power of repeal, such as that embodied in Article V, sufficed
to overcome the difficulty he exposed. Jefferson concluded that it did not,
because “the power of repeal is not an equivalent” to natural expiration
due to the practical impediments of the political process, and certain
failures he saw inherent in a representative democracy. Natural expiration:
might be indeed [an equivalent] if every form of government were so
perfectly contrived that the will of the majority could always be obtained
fairly and without impediment. But this is true of no form. The people
cannot assemble themselves. Their representation is unequal and
vicious. Various checks are opposed to every legislative proposition.
Factions get possession of the public councils. Bribery corrupts them.
Personal interest lead them astray from the general interests of their
constituents: and other impediments arise so as to prove to every
practical man that a law of limited duration is much more manageable
than one which needs a repeal. 41

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 34, at ch. VII, § 119.
Smith, supra note 27, at 634–35.
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Jefferson did not, however, expressly consider the notion of tacit assent,
which figured prominently in Locke’s writings, 42 and which Madison
would use to rebut Jefferson quite effectively. Nor did Jefferson consider
the fact that people may not lend if debts were not necessarily to be
assumed by succeeding generations.
Toward the end of his argument, Jefferson articulated one of his
motivations for this principle: its assumed effect as a prophylactic against
tyranny. Jefferson wrote that “it will exclude at the threshold of our new
government the contagious and ruinous errors of this quarter of the globe,
which have armed despots with means, not sanctioned by nature, for
binding in chains their fellow men.” 43
Jefferson’s concern with these issues was not confined to mere
constitutional theory. He expressed a genuine desire to implement these
concepts as a matter of constitutional practice, perhaps during the coming
struggle over the initial amendments to the Constitution. Jefferson urged
Madison to:
Turn this subject in your mind, my dear Sir, and particularly as to the
power of contracting debts; and develop it with that perspicuity and
cogent logic so peculiarly yours. Your station in the councils of our
country gives you an opportunity of producing it to public consideration,
of forcing it into discussion. At first blush it may be rallied, as a
theoretical speculation: but examination will prove it to be solid and
salutary.44

Madison did not seem to agree.
B.

Madison’s Letter in Opposition

Madison responded to Jefferson in a letter dated February 4, 1790. 45
In that letter, Madison weaved together several lines of argument to rebut
Jefferson’s points to, in the words of one scholar, “devastating effect.”46
At the outset, Madison noted that, while Jefferson’s points raised “many
interesting reflections” as theoretical matters, he was not persuaded the
idea was “in all respects compatible with the course of human affairs” and
42. See LOCKE, supra note 34, at ch. VII, § 119.
43. Smith, supra note 27, at 635.
44. Id. at 635.
45. As noted, although Jefferson’s substantive letter was dated September 6, 1789, he did not
send it to Madison until much later, with a cover letter dated January 9, 1790. The two had even met
at Monticello in December 1789 as Jefferson notes that he “ mentioned [the September letter] to you
when I had the happiness of possessing you at Monticello, but still forgot to give it to you.” Id. at
638–41, 648.
46. ELSTER, supra note 8, at 102 n. 32.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 4

340

AKRON LAW R EVIEW

[54:329

that “the doctrine . . . seems liable in practice to some very powerful
objections.” 47 Before setting out his objections, Madison stated that he
understood Jefferson’s central argument to be: “As the earth belongs to
the living, not to the dead, a living generation can bind itself only.” 48
Central themes of Madison’s objections include the benefits of
stability in the constitutional order, whether the living owe any duty to the
dead, and the Lockean notion of tacit assent. I will also consider here
Madison’s earlier writings in the Federalist, in which he first espoused
some of his ideas on this matter that likely informed his arguments here.
Madison began the objections in his letter by noting that “[t]he acts
of a political Society may be divided into three classes. 1. The
fundamental Constitution of the Government. 2. Laws involving
stipulations which render them irrevocable at the will of the Legislature.
3. Laws involving no such irrevocable quality.” 49 In the American
tradition, constitutional provisions rather than legislative laws seem also
to apply to this second category, as a legislature cannot irrevocably bind
a future legislature. 50 Madison himself appeared to count debts as among
the second category. The third category appears to denote merely positive
laws enacted by a legislature.
1. Stability and its Benefits for Constitutional Order
The first theme Madison invoked in his “endeavor to sketch the
grounds of [his] skepticism” to Jefferson was the notion of constitutional
stability and its myriad attendant benefits. 51 Madison argued that stability
in government over time produces a veneration among the people for the
government with consequent beneficial effects, as he wrote: “Would not
a Government so often revised become too mutable to retain those
prejudices in its favor which antiquity inspires, and which are perhaps a

47. Smith, supra note 27, at 650.
48. Id. Madison’s full paraphrase of Jefferson’s argument is as follows:
As the earth belongs to the living, not to the dead, a living generation can bind itself only:
In every society the will of the majority binds the whole: According to the laws of
mortality, a majority of those ripe at any moment for the exercise of their will do not live
beyond nineteen years: To that term then is limited the validity of every act of the Society;
Nor within that limitation, can any declaration of the public will be valid which is not
express.
Id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 509 (1997) (Legislative entrenchment “ is inconsistent with the democratic principle
that present majorities rule themselves.”).
51. Smith, supra note 27, at 650.
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salutary aid to the most rational Government in the most enlightened
age?” 52 Here, Madison reiterated an idea that he had previously developed
in a Federalist Paper almost two years prior.
In Federalist 49, Madison had considered the notion of appealing to
the people through a constitutional convention as a method of guarding
against the encroachments of a department of government, which
Jefferson previously had alluded to in his Notes on the State of Virginia. 53
There Madison wrote that: “as every appeal to the people would carry an
implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in
great measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time
bestows on everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest
government would not possess the requisite stability.” 54
It should be noted that the formulation of this idea in his 1790 letter
to Jefferson may be a slight permutation of the idea as articulated in
Federalist 49, as Madison’s assumption that each appeal to the people
carries an implication of defects in governments was not fully expressed
in the latter letter. It is unclear whether Madison maintained this
assumption that an appeal to the people implied some defect in
government when the appeal was made not as a medium of checks and
balances, but in the broader context of a regular, periodic appeal, whether
corrective or not. Perhaps the notion remained implicit; a precommitment
to recurrent constitutional conventions necessarily implies an acceptance
of the current or future possibility of defects in government, broadly
defined. Nevertheless, the core of Madison’s thesis remained: the stability
of a constitution over time would increase the veneration for it among the
people, with all the attendant benefits that such stability and veneration
entails. 55
52. Id. at 650–51. For a discussion of the deep entrenchment of present veneration of the U.S.
Constitution, see LEVINSON (2012), supra note 1, at 336–38.
53. See T HOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE S TATE OF VIRGINIA 124–25, 221 (U.N.C. Press
1982). Here, Jefferson also raised relevant issues including endorsing frequent conventions in order
to assess how well the constitution was working, and noting that conventions may fix defects in the
constitution. Id. at 118 (“ This constitution was formed when we were new and unexperienced, in the
science of government. It was the first too which was formed in the whole United States. No wonder
then that time and trial have discovered very capable defects in it.”).
54. T HE F EDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison).
55. Madison touched on some effects of this veneration in Federalist 49, alluding to a stability
feedback loop as the people’s reverence for the laws increased over time: “ When the examples which
fortify opinion are ancient as well as numerous, they are known to have a double effect. In a nation
of philosophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the laws would be
sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a nation of philosophers is as little
to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato.” Id.
This argument also has interesting implications when considered from the modern perspective o f
constitutional veneration. See, e.g., P AUL KAHN, P OLITICAL T HEOLOGY: F OUR NEW C HAPTERS ON
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Returning to the 1790 letter: Madison further argued that, along with
the salutary effects stability may have on public opinion, the certainty
produced by stability in the laws had beneficial effects for property and
improvements. 56 Madison noted that Jefferson’s proposals would induce
a lack of certainty and all its salutary effects, along with the possibility of
anarchy. Madison expressed concern that “all rights depending on positive
laws, that is, most of the rights of property would become absolutely
defunct; and the most violent struggles [ensue].” 57 Recognizing the
connection between the rule of law and property value, Madison painted
a dismal picture regarding this potential for anarchy:
The possibility of an event so hazardous to the rights of property could
not fail to depreciate its value; that the approach of the crisis would
increase this effect; that the frequent return of periods superseding all
the obligations depending on antecedent laws and usages, must be
weak[en]ing the reverence for those obligations, co-operate with
motives to licentiousness already too powerful; and that the uncertainty
incident to such a state of things would on one side discourage thesteady
exertions of industry produced by permanent laws, and on the other, give
a disproportionate advantage to the more, over the less, sagacious and
enterprising part of the Society. 58

Another central effect Madison highlighted was the possibility for
the emergence of factions, either malevolent in effect or in themselves,
that would not otherwise arise without the regular, periodic occurrence of

THE C ONCEPT OF S OVEREIGNTY 14

(2011) (“ At the center of our civil religion is the ‘priesthood’ of
the Court, guarding the sacred text of the constitution.”).
Further, this argument is subject to objections: namely the harmful effects of rigid entrenchment. If,
by this long stability and veneration, a constitution becomes too difficult to amend when a change is
needed, it may produce harmful effects and even become a “ suicide pact.”
56. Here, Madison considered Jefferson’s proposal with respect to his “ 3d. class of acts,”
namely the positive laws revocable at the will of the legislature. Smith, supra note 27, at 651.
57. Smith, supra note 27, at 651. From the perspective of merely changing a constitution at
periodic intervals, an objection might be made to Madison’s point here. Distinguishing between the
fundamental laws articulated by the constituent power and the subordinate laws articulated by the
constituted power and the common law, general laws and rights of property may largely endure across
constitutional regimes. The common law, and indeed many related institutions such as the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, endured from the colonial through the revolutionary period, the
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. This, though is far from certain. And in fairness to
Madison, Jefferson did advance this principle with respect to all laws and Madison here explicitly
considered the effect on the positive laws of the legislature. Perhaps the implication, then, is that
Jefferson’s proposal is not as bad in some applications (merely to constitutions, excepting positive
laws) as it is in others (to both constitutions and positive laws, simultaneously). Nevertheless, there
may be a disincentive to long-term planning if there’s a threat of changes in the positive laws, even if
the property regime does in fact remain the same.
58. See Smith, supra note 27, at 651–52.
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constitutional conventions. Madison questioned whether “such a
periodical revision” would not “engender pernicious factions that might
not otherwise come into existence?” 59 Recurring constitutional
conventions might provide an impetus for the emergence of malignant
factions that may not otherwise coalesce to exert power where higher
hurdles existed prior to the convening of the constituent power, namely
the power of “the people” to establish or modify their form of
government. 60 Further, emergent factions need not have malevolent intent
to be destructive. In Federalist 49, Madison noted that frequent recourse
to constitutional conventions would create a situation in which “[t]he
passions . . . not the reason, of the public would sit in judgment.” 61
Worse yet, for Madison, this propensity for faction and lack of
continuity could facilitate a fundamental lapse in constitutional order:
“Would not . . . a Government depending for its existence beyond a fixed
date, on some positive and authentic intervention of the Society itself, be
too subject to the casualty and consequences of an actual interregnum?”62
As Madison convincingly articulated, Jefferson’s proposal raises the risk
of a failure to maintain the continuity of both constitutional order and the

59. Id. Stephen Holmes notes:
Here, as elsewhere, Madison revealed his indebtedness to Hume: ‘were one to choose a
period of time, when the people’s consent was the least regarded in public transactions, it
would be precisely on the establishment of a new government. In a settled constitution,
their inclinations are often consulted; but during the fury of revolutions, conquests, and
public convulsions, military force or political craft usually decides the controversy.
Holmes, supra note 8, at 217 n.78 (quoting DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS:
MORAL, P OLITICAL, AND LITERARY 461 (1963)).
60. This argument is susceptible to the objection there may not be such a large divide between
the factions, interests, and passions present in ordinary politics and those at work in a constituent
assembly itself. Constituent assemblies may even be more factional and polarized. See, e.g., Jon
Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. P A. J. C ONST. L. 345, 347 (2000).
61. T HE F EDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 54 (James Madison). There, Madison also expressed
concern over “ [t]he danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public
passions.” Id. This point is intriguing given that scholars have since noted that constitutions are often
written in times of high passion, contrary to the conventional belief that they are “ Peter sober
legislating for Peter drunk.” Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It, 81 T EX. L.
R EV. 1751, 1768–69 (2003) (citing JED R UBENFELD, F REEDOM AND T IME 130 (2001)); see also
ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 8, at 89 (citing F RIEDRICH A. HAYEK, T HE C ONSTITUTION
OF LIBERTY 180 (1960)); Id. at 159 (“ [T]he premise of a sober Peter may not be fulfilled in reality. It
is an overwhelming empirical regularity that constitutions tend to be written in times of turbulence
and upheaval in which passions tend to run high.”). Perhaps, though, a Jeffersonian arrangement o f
recurrent conventions at a set interval would mitigate this tendency to convene conventions only in
times of high passion, as a mandatory convention may occur in times of relative calm.
62. Smith, supra note 27, at 651. Akhil Amar notes that Madison properly criticized Jefferson
for his proposal that “ replaces the product of earlier popular deliberation with anarchy.” Akhil Reed
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. C HI . L. R EV. 1043,
1074 (1988).
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laws—a harm to be avoided in any political society committed to the rule
of law.
2. A Living Duty to the Dead
Another distinct line of argument Madison raised sounds in
deontology: the living owe a duty to the dead because they enjoy the fruits
of the dead’s improvements. 63 As Madison wrote:
If the earth be the gift of nature to the living their title can extend to the
earth in its natural State only. The improvements made by the dead form
a charge against the living who take the benefit of them. This charge can
no otherwise be satisfied than by executing the will of the dead
accompanying the improvements. 64

Thus, in obtaining the benefit of the improvements left for posterity,
present generations also acquire the obligation of adhering to the prior
generation’s will with respect to the improvements. 65 Their adherence is
consideration for the benefit received.
Taking up Jefferson’s points about the debts incurred by one
generation, Madison argued that the benefits of the debts themselves may
accrue to future generations. He wrote:
Debts may be incurred for purposes which interest the unborn, as well
as the living: such are debts for repelling a conquest, the evils of which
descend through many generations. Debts may even be incurred
principally for the benefit of posterity: such perhaps is the present debt
of the U. States, which far exceeds any burdens which the present

63. Madison addressed this line of argument to those laws in his “ 2d. class,” namely “ [l]aws
involving stipulations which render them irrevocable at the will of the Legislature.” Smith, supra note
27, at 650.
64. Id. at 651 (emphasis added).
65. This argument, too, is amenable to objections on numerous grounds, including the
epistemic issue of how to discern a “ will of the dead accompanying the improvements,” if one exists
or existed. It is also unclear how long that will must be enforced (as long as the improvements exist?)
and the breadth of the will’s binding scope (i.e. if the “ improvements” are the Constitution, the very
foundations of political order, this implies binding commitments throughout all of political life).
In defense of Madison’s point, Steven Holmes writes: “ True, future generations are seldom asked i f
they wish to accept a benefit (say, the defeat of Hitler) in exchange for assuming a debt. But if all
civilized contracts required copresence then each generation would be reduced to a separate nation,
that is, would be calamitously deprived of the advantages resulting from coopering across time in
which partners cannot, in principle, encounter one another. Practical considerations alone suggest
that, in such cases, we should override the formal principle that no obligations can be incurred without
express consent.” Holmes, supra note 8, at 219.
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generation could well apprehend for itself. The term of 19 years might
not be sufficient for discharging the debts in either of these cases.66

As the benefits of the debts incurred are enjoyed across generations, the
burdens should be borne across generations in proportion to those
benefits. 67 Madison eloquently summarized his argument on this point:
There seems then to be a foundation in the nature of things, in the
relation which one generation bears to another, for the descent of
obligations from one to another. Equity requires it. Mutual good is
promoted by it. All that is indispensable in adjusting the account
between the dead and the living is to see that the debits against the latter
do not exceed the advances made by the former. Few of the
incumbrances entailed on nations would bear a liquidation even on this
principle. 68

But how to overcome Jefferson’s likely objection that the living neither
took a role in forming nor provided their consent to the constitution and
the laws under which they live? Madison proposed the notion of tacit
assent.
3. Tacit Assent
Implicit in and related to the deontological argument is Madison’s
constructive proposal to overcome the tensions Jefferson exposed: the
“received doctrine [of] tacit assent.” 69 The people, by their use and
enjoyment of the establishments and improvements of prior generations,
tacitly consent to the duties attendant to those improvements, the
fulfilment of which constitutes the present generation’s consideration
binding them to the previous generation’s will. Further, the people’s
failing to change the constitution or laws when they have the means to do
so by amendment bolsters this notion of tacit assent to the present state of
affairs. As Madison stated the principle, “a tacit assent may be given to
established Constitutions and laws, and that this assent may be inferred,
where no positive dissent appears.” 70
66. Smith, supra note 27, at 651.
67. See Holmes, supra note 8, at 219.
68. Smith, supra note 27, at 651.
69. Id. at 652. This point also may overcome the problem in Madison’s contractual argument
that there was no offer/acceptance agreement between the dead and the living for the improvements
by which the living benefit. Tacit assent may indeed be a stronger grounding than a quasi-contractual
unjust enrichment theory.
70. Id. Madison, here, neglects to consider that, if it is difficult to amend the Constitution,
positive dissent may not “ appear,” given the difficult nature of successfully organizing and achieving
the desired amendment.
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Madison argued that, between Jefferson’s proposal and the adoption
of tacit assent, the balance of harms fell in favor of tacit assent:
It seems less impracticable to remedy, by wise plans of Government, the
dangerous operation of this doctrine, than to find a remedy for the
difficulties inseparable from the other. May it not be questioned whether
it be possible to exclude wholly the idea of tacit assent, without
subverting the foundation of civil Society?71

Madison sought to address this question by asking “[o]n what principle
does the voice of the majority bind the minority?” 72 He held that here,
contrary to Jefferson, that “[i]t does not result I conceive from the law of
nature, but from compact founded on conveniency. . . . Prior then to the
establishment of this principle, unanimity was necessary; and strict
Theory at all times presupposes the assent of every member to the
establishment of the rule itself.” 73 Thus, tacit assent conjoined with
majority rule are sufficient to overcome Jefferson’s objections.
Without a principle of tacit assent, persons daily reaching the age of
majority would not “be bound by acts of the Majority.” 74 Thus, “either a
unanimous repetition of every law would be necessary on the accession
of new members, or an express assent must be obtained from these to the
rule by which the voice of the Majority is made the voice of the whole.”75
Here, Madison exposed the unworkable nature of Jefferson’s proposal in
practice. The notion of a generation on which Jefferson’s argument so
heavily relies is a veritable fiction. Of course, there are not clear divisions
between generations such that Jefferson’s generation-based formula may
apply. Rather, generations blend seamlessly into each other across an
uninterrupted temporal plane.
After this biting and comprehensive critique, Madison softened his
tone with his friend. He noted that “it is so much easier to espy the little
difficulties immediately incident to every great plan, than to comprehend
its general and remote benefits.” 76 Madison also reiterated his insistence
that Jefferson’s ideas were interesting in theory, but that Madison’s
objections were rooted in the consequences of their practical
implementation:

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The observations are not meant to impeach either the utility of the
principle in some particular cases; or the general importance of it in the
eye of the philosophical Legislator. On the contrary it would give me
singular pleasure to see it first announced in the proceedings of the U.
States, and always kept in their view, as a salutary curb on the living
generation from imposing unjust or unnecessary burdens on their
successors. But this is a pleasure which I have little hope of enjoying.77

Madison noted that did not believe he would see the view implemented
because of the lofty principles necessary to Jefferson’s reasoning were
beyond the present perspective of political actors, writing:
The spirit of philosophical legislation has never reached some parts of
the Union, and is by no means the fashion here, either within or without
Congress. . . . [O]ur hemisphere must be still more enlightened before
many of the sublime truths which are seen thro’ the medium of
Philosophy, become visible to the naked eye of the ordinary Politician.78

Thus, Madison did not believe that the people or their representatives
were, in large part, sufficiently enlightened to responsibly implement
Jefferson’s principle.
Madison’s view of the practical possibility of Jefferson’s proposal
appears very much shaped by the turbulent times in which he wrote. After
the fears aroused by Shay’s Rebellion and the disjunction under the
Articles of Confederation, as well as the great struggle Madison had
recently endured both to draft the Constitution at Philadelphia and in the
ratification debates, Madison was acutely aware of the difficulties of
forging constitutional consensus in turbulent circumstances. He also did
recognize that “all the existing [state] constitutions were formed in the
midst of a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order
and concord; of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic
leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national
questions; of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by
a universal resentment and indignation against the ancient
government . . . .” 79 But, with respect to Jefferson’s proposal for, what
Madison described as, “a frequent reference of constitutional questions
to . . . the whole society,” Madison maintained that “[t]he danger of
disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public
passions” was too great. 80 Thus, in both theory and practice, Madison
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
T HE F EDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 54 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
Id.
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maintained that recurrent recourse to constitutional conventions brought
more harm than good.
C.

Jefferson’s Rebuttal

Jefferson did not directly respond to Madison’s February 1790 letter.
Jefferson did, however, take up the matter again twenty-six years later in
a letter of July 12, 1816 to Samuel Kercheval, a Virginia attorney and
friend. Here, Jefferson lamented that “[s]ome men look at Constitutions
with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc [sic] of the
covenant, too sacred to be touched.”81
Jefferson did display, however, that the fervor of his position on the
issue may have been mitigated by experience and, perhaps, reason, as he
wrote: “I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in
laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be born
with; because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them,
and find practical means of correcting their ill effects.” 82 Nonetheless,
Jefferson maintained the core of his views on the periodic revision of a
constitution. Here, Jefferson grounded his firm conviction in the idea of
periodic revision in an Enlightenment ideal of rational human progress,
writing:
I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and
manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might
as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy,
as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous
ancestors. It is this preposterous idea which has lately deluged Europe
in blood. 83

In keeping with his notion of progress, he sought “to correct the crude
essays of our first and unexperienced, although wise, virtuous, and well-

81. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, supra note 26, at 558–59.
82. Id. at 559. An argument may be made that this reserved position was always Jefferson’s
view. One commentator noted that the Declaration of Independence, drafted by Jefferson, argues fo r
dissolving political associations only when “ it becomes necessary” to do so. Ilan Wurman, The
Original Understanding of Constitutional Legitimacy, 2014 B.Y.U. L. R EV. 819, 864 (2014).
Nonetheless, Jefferson’s September 6, 1789 letter to Madison expresses his position fervently and
does not contain the reserved caveats of his July 12, 1816 letter to Kercheval. See Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, supra note 26.
83. Id.
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meaning councils. And lastly, let us provide in our constitution for its
revision at stated periods.” 84
As to the question of “[w]hat these periods should be,” Jefferson
returned to his conviction that “nature herself indicates.” Maintaining his
reliance on his generational theory, Jefferson wrote:
Each generation is as independent as the one preceding, as that was of
all which had gone before. It has then, like them, a right to choose for
itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its own
happiness; consequently, to accommodate to the circumstances in which
it finds itself, that received from its predecessors; and it is for the peace
and good of mankind, that a solemn opportunity of doing this every
nineteen or twenty years, should be provided by the constitution; so that
it may be handed on, with periodical repairs, from generation to
generation, to the end of time, if anything human can so long endure.85

Jefferson also attempted to rebut at least one of Madison’s critiques
of his position, namely the deontological claim of the dead upon the
living. In implicit response to Madison’s contractual argument that the
living must carry out the will of the dead that accompanied the
improvements made by the dead, Jefferson asked who had “the right to
hold in obedience to their will” the majority of citizens:
The dead? But the dead have no rights. They are nothing; and nothing
cannot own something. Where there is no substance, there can be no
accident. This corporeal globe, and everything upon it, belong to its
present corporeal inhabitants, during their generation. They alone have
a right to direct what is the concern of themselves alone, and to declare
the law of that direction; and this declaration can only be made by their
majority. That majority, then, has a right to depute representatives to a
convention, and to make the constitution what they think will be the best
for themselves.

Unfortunately, Jefferson did not here rebut other of Madison’s numerous
critiques. Thus, no direct inferences may be drawn with respect to their
exchange besides the fact that the practical experience of “forty years in
government” did not persuade Jefferson that his view of periodic revision
was impracticable, which was the foundation of Madison’s critique.
Jefferson did identify a problem with his theory: how to discern the
will of the people. Jefferson’s solution involved voting in municipal ward
divisions through which “the voice of the whole people would be thus

84.
85.

Id. at 559–60 (emphasis added).
Id.
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fairly, fully, and peaceably expressed, discussed, and decided by the
common reason of society.” 86 Jefferson was concerned, however, that:
[i]f this avenue be shut to the call of sufferance, it will make itself heard
through that of force, and we shall go on, as other nations are doing, in
the endless circle of oppression, rebellion, reformation; and oppression,
rebellion, reformation, again; and so on forever.87

Thus, for Jefferson, recourse to the people and providing them a voice on
this question was a means of alleviating the pressures that, if otherwise
repressed, could lead to revolution. Indeed, Jefferson ended his letter
stating that if Kercheval should “approve and enforce” his opinions, “they
may do some good.” If he did not approve of them, he should keep them
to himself “as the effusions of withered age and useless time.”
Notably, nowhere in this letter does Jefferson call for the natural
expiration of the constitution and laws, as he had in his 1789 letter on the
topic. Providing in the constitution “for its revision at stated periods” does
not necessarily assume the same discontinuity of political order that
naturally expiring constitutions requires. Whether Jefferson intended to
soften his position, or did not recognize this distinction, is unclear.
Ultimately, Jefferson’s robust rejection of the idea of tacit assent
appears to be the primary cleavage in the unbridgeable gap between his
and Madison’s views. The rejection of tacit consent also forms the
foundation of Jefferson’s call for recurring conventions, which are
necessary to ensure positive consent from each generation. Although
Jefferson may have been persuaded by experience or reason to soften his
stance on natural expiration of a constitution, he explicitly maintained his
call for its periodic revision.
Despite no success with his aim at the federal level and the
widespread impression that Madison “won” the debate, myriad individual
United States have implemented Jefferson’s vision. Thus far, eighteen
states have adopted Jefferson’s principle in their constitutions at different
periods. I next provide a general overview of the various states that have
adopted such provisions and brief histories of their adoption and
invocation.

86.
87.

Id. at 561.
Id.
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III. T HE LABORAT ORIES IN ACT ION: ST AT ES T HAT HAVE IMPLEMENT ED
AUT OMAT IC QUEST ION PROVISIONS
Throughout the history of state constitutions, 18 states have at some
point adopted a provision either mandating a convention be held or
mandating future referendums on whether to hold a convention. At
present, 14 states retain “automatic question” provisions mandating a
referendum on whether to hold a constitutional convention be submitted
to the people at regular, periodic intervals. 88 States have adopted these
provisions relatively consistently across the course of American
constitutional history, with several states adopting automatic question
provisions in each of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries. In the subsections
that follow, I provide very brief overviews of the state constitutional
histories with respect to these questions. Recognizing that state surveys
induce groans from readers (and writers alike), I present only skeletal
sketches to orient this conversation. 89
A.

18th Century Constitutions

Three states adopted such provisions in the 18th century:
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Kentucky. Massachusetts was the
first to adopt a mandatory question provision in its 1780 Constitution,
which is widely noted for its unprecedented democratic elements, both in
constitutional substance and ratification method. 90 This provision
required that “[i]n order the more effectually to adhere to the principles of
the constitution, and to correct those violations which by any means may
be made therein, as well as to form such alterations as from experience
shall be found necessary,” the legislature must call in 1795 for a vote of
the qualified voters from the various municipalities “for the purpose of
collecting their sentiments on the necessity or expediency of revising the
constitution, in order to amendments.” 91 If two-thirds of those voters
answered in favor of revisions, the provision called for a constitutional

88. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 11 at 569–70.
89. A full history of each particular state’s constitutional history with respect to automatic call
provisions would be a fascinating and fruitful endeavor, but is beyond the scope of this work.
90. John Adams prepared the first draft of this constitution, and he noted that he “ had the honor
to be principal engineer.” LOUIS ADAMS F ROTHINGHAM, A B RIEF HISTORY OF THE C ONSTITUTION
AND GOVERNMENT OF MASSACHUSETTS 26 (1916) (citing 4 C.F. ADAMS, LIFE AND W ORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 216). I need to perform further research to discern, if possible, if the mandatory call provision
was in his draft of the constitution. Nonetheless, it is a point of some interest that Jefferson, an obvious
proponent of such a provision, and Adams, the “ principal engineer” of the first constitution to adopt
such a provision, were two of the most leading statesmen absent from the Philadelphia Convention.
91. MASS. C ONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. X (superseded 1821 by MASS. C ONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. IX).
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convention to assemble. 92 That vote was held as scheduled in 1795.
Although a majority voted in favor of a convention, that simple majority
did not cross the two-third threshold and a convention was not held. 93
Though this provision of the 1780 Constitution of Massachusetts existed
at the time of Jefferson and Madison’s exchange, it is curious that neither
made reference to it. A draft of a revised constitution from an 1853
Massachusetts convention contained an automatic question provision,
along with numerous other proposed amendments, but that revised
constitution was rejected by the people of that Commonwealth. 94 The
1780 Constitution, with dozens of amendments, remains in force.
New Hampshire has demonstrated the most robust commitment to
the principle of periodic conventions. In its 1784 Constitution, New
Hampshire adopted a mandatory convention provision, requiring that a
convention be called seven years after that Constitution’s adoption with
no prior vote of the people or legislature required. 95 The 1792 convention
convened and replaced that provision with an automatic question
provision requiring that a vote on whether to call a constitutional
convention be submitted to the people every seven years in perpetuity. 96
Thus, New Hampshire became the first state to adopt the Jeffersonian
principle of automatic, recurrent recourse to the people. Until a 1964
amendment to allow the legislature to propose amendments, a
constitutional convention was the only means of amending the New
Hampshire constitution and many were held under the provision. 97
In its 1792 constitution, Kentucky adopted another unique
implementation of the principle. That constitution required that the
question whether to hold a convention be automatically submitted to the
people in 1797 and, if approved by a majority, resubmitted to the people
again in 1798. 98 If approved by a majority a second time, a convention
would convene. 99 Kentuckians voted in the affirmative in both elections

92. Id.
93. See Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 399; Martineau, supra note 11, at 439
(recording votes of 11,386 in favor, and 10,867 opposed).
94. F ROTHINGHAM, supra note 90, at 53–59.
95. N.H. C ONST. pt. 2, art. 99 (1784) (superseded 1792 by N.H. C ONST. pt. 2, art. 99);
Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 399.
96. N.H. C ONST. pt. 2, art. 99 (1784) (repealed and superseded 1980 by N.H. C ONST. pt. 2, art.
100); Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 399.
97. S USAN E. MARSHALL, T HE NEW HAMPSHIRE S TATE C ONSTITUTION: A R EFERENCE GUIDE
17 (2004).
98. KY. C ONST. art. XI (1792) (superseded 1799 by KY. C ONST. art. IX).
99. Id.
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and convened a convention in 1799. 100 The constitution that emerged from
that convention did not contain an automatic question provision.
B.

19th Century Constitutions

In the 19th century, 7 states adopted automatic call provisions:
Indiana, New York, Michigan, Maryland, Ohio, Iowa, and Virginia. In its
inaugural Constitution of 1816, Indiana adopted New Hampshire’s model,
except with a 12-year interval between automatic calls. 101 Notably, this
provision attempted to limit future conventions with respect to the issue
of slavery or involuntary servitude, which the language of the provision
sought to prohibit in perpetuity. 102 Notwithstanding the conceptual
problems with attempts to bind both future conventions and the
constituent power generally, this provision is an interesting testament to
Indiana’s heritage as a state from the Northwest Territory. The Northwest
Ordinance prohibited slavery in this fashion. 103
Indiana held a subsequent convention resulting in the Constitution of
1851. The document did not include an automatic question provision,
which has thus far spelled an end to the Jeffersonian experiment in this
state. 104 Indiana was one of two states to eliminate its automatic question
provision in a subsequent convention, the other being Virginia. The 1851
constitution remains in force. 105

100. Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 399.
101. IND. C ONST. art. VIII (1816) (superseded 1851 by IND. C ONST.). The provision read:
Every twelfth year, after this constitution shall have taken effect, at the general election
held for Governor there shall be a poll opened, in which the qualified Electors of the State
shall express, by vote, whether they are in favour of calling a convention, or not, and if
there should be a majority of all the votes given at such election, in favour of a convention,
the Governor shall inform the next General Assembly thereof, whose duty it shall be to
provide, by law, for the election of the members to the convention, the number thereof,
and the time and place of their meeting; which law shall not be passed unless agreed to by
a majority of all the members elected to both branches of the General assembly, and which
convention, when met, shall have it in their power to revise, amend, or change the
constitution. But, as the holding any part of the human Creation in slavery, or involuntary
servitude, can only originate in usurpation and tyranny, no alteration of this constitution
shall ever take place so as to introduce slavery or involuntary servitude in this State,
otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.
Id.
102.
103.

See id.
See AMAR I, supra note 23, at 260; W ILLIAM P. MCLAUGHLAN, T HE INDIANA S TATE
C ONSTITUTION: A R EFERENCE GUIDE 4 (1996).
104. See IND. C ONST. art. 16; see Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 399.
105. See, e.g., MCLAUGHLAN, supra note 103, at 1.
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New York adopted the automatic question in its 1846 constitution.
New York’s provision calls for the submission of the question every 20
years and remains in force. 106 As one commentator noted, “[t]he provision
legitimized the extraconstitutional tradition of the legislature, submitting
the question of the calling of a constitutional convention to the people.”107
Moreover, New York was the first state to adopt the automatic question
in conjunction with a legislative method of amending the constitution—
prior to New York, the states adopting the automatic question had done
so as the sole means of amending their constitutions. 108 The New York
provision has thus far resulted in six conventions, some of which have
amended the provision slightly for non-material date updates. 109 Most
recently, the people of New York voted on whether to hold a convention
in November 2017, and voting overwhelmingly against holding one. 110
Michigan followed by adopting an automatic call provision in 1850.
111 As one commentator noted “Michigan has heeded Jefferson’s
advice . . . . [and] made reconsideration of the constitution a regular
feature of Michigan politics.” 112 Notably, the provision was amended in
the 1908 constitution to alter the way in which the majority vote was
counted. That constitution counted the majority of voters voting on the
106. N.Y. C ONST. art. XIX, § 2. It reads:
At the general election to be held in the year nineteen hundred fifty-seven, and every
twentieth year thereafter, and also at such times as the legislature may by law provide, the
question “ Shall there be a convention to revise the constitution and amend the same?” shall
be submitted to and decided by the electors of the state; and in case a majority of the
electors voting thereon shall decide in favor of a convention for such purpose, the electors
of every senate district of the state, as then organized, shall elect three delegates at the next
ensuing general election, and the electors of the state voting at the same election shall elect
fifteen delegates-at-large. The delegates so elected shall convene at the capitol on the first
Tuesday of April next ensuing after their election, and shall continue their session until
the business of such convention shall have been completed. . . .
Id.
107. P ETER J. GALIE, T HE NEW YORK S TATE C ONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 280 (1990).
108. Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 400.
109. Id. at 403 tbl.1.
110. See McKinley, supra note 10; Bottini, supra note 11.
111. MICH. C ONST. of 1850, art. 20, § 2. It reads:
At the general election to be held in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-six,
and in each sixteenth year thereafter, and also at such other times as the Legislature may
by law provide, the question of the general revision of the constitution shall be submitted
to the electors qualified to vote for members of the Legislature, and in case a majority of
the electors so qualified, voting at such election, shall decide in favor of a convention for
such purposes, the Legislature, at the next session, shall provide by law for the election of
such delegates to such convention. All the amendments shall take effect at the
commencement of the year after their adoption.
Id.
112.

S USAN P. F INO, THE MICHIGAN S TATE C ONSTITUTION: A R EFERENCE GUIDE 239 (1996).
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question, rather than at the election, as sufficient to convene a
convention. 113 The present provision calls for a referendum on the
question every 16 years. 114
Maryland adopted an automatic question provision in 1851. 115 The
original provision, which required that the legislature discern the “sense
of the people” every ten years with respect to holding a convention, was
amended in 1867 to extend the duration to every twenty years. 116 A
constitutional convention has never been called under this provision,
although Maryland has held three conventions since its adoption, in 1864,
1867, and 1967–68. 117 Interestingly, when the question was posed to the
people in both 1930 and 1950, small majorities of the voters approved the
holding of a convention on both occasions. The legislature, however,
declined to call a convention, reasoning that the provision required a
“majority of voters at such election,” rather than a majority of voters
voting on the question, and the “yes” vote in both years fell short of that
mark. 118

113. Compare MICH. C ONST. of 1850, art. 20, § 2 (“ voting at such election”) with MICH. C ONST.
of 1908 (“ a majority of the electors voting on the question”).
114. MICH. C ONST. art. 12, § 3. It states:
At the general election to be held in the year 1978, and in each 16th year thereafter and at
such times as may be provided by law, the question of a general revision of the constitution
shall be submitted to the electors of the state. If a majority of the electors voting on the
question decide in favor of a convention for such purpose, at an election to be held not
later than six months after the proposal was certified as approved . . . .
Id.
115. See Charles A. Rees, Remarkable Evolution: The Early Constitutional History of
Maryland, 36 U. B ALT. L. R EV. 217, 266 (2007). The current provision reads:
It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to provide by Law for taking, at the general
election to be held in the year nineteen hundred and seventy, and every twenty years
thereafter, the sense of the People in regard to calling a Convention for altering this
Constitution; and if a majority of voters at such election or elections shall vote for a
Convention, the General Assembly, at its next session, shall provide by Law for the
assembling of such convention, and for the election of Delegates thereto. Each County,
and Legislative District of the City of Baltimore, shall have in such Convention a number
of Delegates equal to its representation in both Houses at the time at which the Convention
is called. But any Constitution, or change, or amendment of the existing Constitution,
which may be adopted by such Convention, shall be submitted to the voters of this State,
and shall have no effect unless the same shall have been adopted by a majority of the voters
voting thereon.
MD. C ONST. art. XIV, § 2.
116. DAN F RIEDMAN, T HE MARYLAND S TATE C ONSTITUTION: A R EFERENCE GUIDE 262–63
(2006).
117. Id. at 263.
118. Id.; Dan Friedman, Magnificent Failure Revisited: Modern Maryland Constitutional Law
from 1967 to 1998, 58 MD. L. R EV. 528, 530 n.6 (1999).
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Ohio also adopted an automatic question provision in its 1851
Constitution. 119 In a 1912 convention, Ohioans amended the provision to
make a majority of those voting on the question, rather than a majority of
those voting at the election, sufficient to convene a convention, thereby
preempting the issue that arose in Maryland. 120 Still, the only time voters
have called for a convention under this provision was in 1871. 121
Iowa included an automatic question provision in the document
emerging from its third constitutional convention in 1857. 122 The
provision remains in force, although no convention has been convened
under it since the provision was adopted more than 160 years ago. 123
Interestingly, Iowa voters approved of holding a convention in the vote
under this provision in 1920, but the legislature failed to convene a
convention and one was not held. 124 This raises interesting constitutional
issues of the legislature’s failure to abide by the constitutional provision
that are, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this work. Whether to involve
the legislature in the submission of the question and in the convening of a
119. The pertinent part of the present provision reads:
At the general election to be held in the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty-two,
and in each twentieth year thereafter, the question: “ Shall there be a convention to revise,
alter, or amend the constitution,” shall be submitted to the electors of the state; and in case
a majority of the electors, voting for and against the calling of a convention, shall decide
in favor of a convention, the general assembly, at its next session, shall provide, by law,
for the election of delegates, and the assembling of such convention, as is provided in the
preceding section . . .
OHIO C ONST. art. XVI, § 3.
120. See P ROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF THE S TATE
OF OHIO, 1912, R EPORTED BY C. W ALKER, (Columbus: F.J. Herr Printing 1912); see also S TEVEN H.
S TEINGLASS & GINA J. S CARSELLI , T HE OHIO S TATE C ONSTITUTION: A R EFERENCE GUIDE 323
(2004).
121. S TEINGLASS, supra note 120, at 323.
122. See IOWA C ONST. art. X, § 3; JACK S TARK, T HE IOWA S TATE C ONSTITUTION: A
R EFERENCE GUIDE (1998). Iowa held prior conventions in 1844 and 1846. S TARK, at 2–3. The
pertinent portion of the provision reads:
At the general election to be held in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy, and
in each tenth year thereafter, and also at such times as the general assembly may, by law,
provide, the question, “ Shall there be a convention to revise the constitution, and propose
amendment or amendments to same?” shall be decided by the electors qualified to vote
for members of the general assembly; and in case a majority of the electors so qualified,
voting at such election, for and against such proposition, shall decide in favor of a
convention for such purpose, the general assembly, at its next session, shall provide by
law for the election of delegates to such convention, and for submitting the results of said
convention to the people, in such manner and at such time as the general assembly shall
provide . . . .
IOWA C ONST. art. X, § 3.
123. S TARK, supra note 122, at 10.
124. Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 403; B ENJAMIN F. S HAMBAUGH, T HE
C ONSTITUTIONS OF IOWA 281–82 (Historical Socy. of Iowa 1934).
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convention was, however, a significant point of debate in many
conventions as discussed below. Notably, the Iowa legislature’s failure
was not litigated. 125
Virginia presents a curious case: Virginians adopted an automatic
question provision in their 1870 Constitution but did away with it in 1902.
As we shall see, there is evidence to suggest that delegates to the 1902
Virginia convention were acutely concerned with restricting the suffrage
of African–Americans. 126 Given the anti-democratic sentiment prevailing
at Virginia’s 1902 convention, it is perhaps unsurprising that the highly
democratic automatic question provision was eliminated. Virginia has not
subsequently reinstituted an automatic question provision, despite two
prominent constitutional revisions in 1928 and 1971, and two “limited”
conventions in 1945 and 1956. 127 It remains one of only two states to have
eliminated the automatic question provision after adopting a recurring call
on the issue, the other being Indiana.
C.

20th Century Constitutions

The 20th century witnessed a third wave of adoptions of automatic
question provisions, with 8 states adopting such clauses: Oklahoma,
Missouri, Hawaii, Alaska, Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, and Rhode
Island. Oklahoma was the first state in the 20th century to adopt an
automatic question provision in its inaugural constitution of 1907.
Interestingly, the provision has not been strictly enforced or regularly
submitted to the people every 20 years. This requirement is, apparently,
“routinely ignored.” 128 Proposals for calling a convention were submitted
to and rejected by voters in 1926, 1950, and 1970. 129 The proposal has not
been submitted to the people since 1970, despite the every 20-year
submission requirement remaining in the Constitution. 130 Oklahoma’s

125. S TARK, supra note 122, at 154.
126. See, e.g., JOHN DINAN, T HE VIRGINIA S TATE C ONSTITUTION: A R EFERENCE GUIDE 15
(2006).
127. See id. at 18–24.
128. DANNY M. ADKISON & LISA MCNAIR P ALMER, T HE OKLAHOMA S TATE C ONSTITUTION:
A R EFERENCE GUIDE 9, 18, 299 (2001) (also suggesting without citation that the voters repealed this
requirement in 1994, but the constitutional text remains as is); see also Sanford V. Levinson &
William D. Blake, When Americans Think About Constitutional Reform: Some Data and Reflections,
77 OHIO S T. L.J. 211, 215 (2016); John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendments and American
Constitutionalism, 41 OKLA. C ITY U. L. REV. 27, 33 (2016).
129. Id. at 18.
130. See Levinson & Blake, supra note 128, at 215; see also OKLA. C ONST. art. XXIV, § 2.
(“ Provided, That the question of such proposed convention shall be submitted to the people at least
once in every twenty years.”).
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constitution still retains means for calling a convention through the
legislature, but the state has not held a convention since its first in 1907.
Missouri adopted an automatic call provision in 1920 through the
highly democratic mechanism of constitutional initiative, both submitted
and approved by voters. 131 Thus, the issue was not debated in a convention
prior to adoption. Missouri voters have called two conventions under
mandatory votes, in 1922 and 1943. 132
Connecticut adopted an automatic call provision in 1965, after its
prior two constitutions of 1818 and 1955 lacked provisions for convening
constitutional conventions. 133 The provision remains in force, but no
convention has been called under it.
Hawaii adopted an automatic question provision in its 1959
inaugural state constitution. 134 Hawaii has held two constitutional
conventions since then, one in 1968 and one in 1978. Hawaii maintains
this provision and continues to submit the referenda question whenever
nine years has elapsed since the last submission. 135
Alaska also adopted an automatic question provision in its 1959
inaugural state constitution. The Alaska provision specifies the
referendum requirements in detail. It provides that the lieutenant governor
must place the referendum question on the ballot and articulates the
specific wording of the question on the ballot. 136 This specificity
131.
132.
133.

Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 399; Martineau, supra note 11, at 453–54 n.54.
Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 403.
C ONN. C ONST. art. XIII, § 2; W ESLEY W. HORTON, T HE C ONNECTICUT C ONSTITUTION: A
R EFERENCE GUIDE 162 (1993). The provision reads:
The question “ Shall there be a Constitutional Convention to amend or revise the
Constitution of the State?” shall be submitted to all the electors of the state at the general
election held on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in the even-numbered
year next succeeding the expiration of a period of twenty years from the date of convening
of the last convention called to revise or amend the constitution of the state, including the
Constitutional Convention of 1965, or next succeeding the expiration of a period of twenty
years from the date of submission of such a question to all electors of the state, whichever
date shall last occur. If a majority of the electors voting on the question shall signify “ yes”,
the general assembly shall provide for such convention as provided in Section 3 of this
article.
C ONN. C ONST., art. XIII, § 2.
134. HAWAII C ONST. art. 17, § 2. The provision reads in part:
The legislature may submit to the electorate at any general or special election the question,
“ Shall there be a convention to propose a revision of or amendments to the Constitution?”
If any nine-year period shall elapse during which the question shall not have been
submitted, the lieutenant governor shall certify the question, to be voted on at the first
general election following the expiration of such period.
Id.
135. See id.; League of Women Voters of Hawaii v. Doi, 552 P.2d 1392, 1393 (1976); Trask,
supra note 12, at 291, 320.
136. ALASKA C ONST. art XIII, § 3. The provision reads:
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generated controversy. In 1970, the question whether to hold a convention
received an affirmative vote 34,911 to 34,472. 137 The referendum
language used, however, was more expansive than language mandated by
the Constitution, which called for the question, “Shall there be a
Constitutional Convention?” The Lieutenant Governor, however,
included a preface, reading, “As required by the Constitution of the State
of Alaska,” prior to the question on the ballot. The election was challenged
which brought the issue of the meaning of the clause to the Alaska
Supreme Court. The court found that the referendum language used by the
Lieutenant Governor was misleading in that it suggested that the
constitution required that a convention be held, rather than merely a vote.
The Court noted that the “referendum ballot so far departed from the
constitutionally prescribed form of ballot that the electorate’s right to vote
on the question was impermissibly infringed.” 138 The Court struck down
the election results and called for a new vote on the issue at the next
election, where the question was defeated. 139
Illinois included an automatic question provision in its constitution
in 1970, which requires submission of the question every 20 years. 140 The
state has never called a convention under this provision. 141 Montana
adopted an automatic question provision in its 1972 Constitution. 142
If during any ten-year period a constitutional convention has not been held, the lieutenant
governor shall place on the ballot for the next general election the question: “ Shall there
be a Constitutional Convention?” If a majority of the votes cast on the question are in the
negative, the question need not be placed on the ballot until the end of the next ten-year
period. If a majority of the votes cast on the question are in the affirmative, delegates to
the convention shall be chosen at the next regular statewide election, unless the legislature
provides for the election of the delegates at a special election. The lieutenant governor
shall issue the call for the convention. Unless other provisions have been made by law, the
call shall conform as nearly as possible to the act calling the Alaska Constitutional
Convention of 1955, including, but not limited to, number of members, districts, election
and certification of delegates, and submission and ratification of revisions and ordinances.
The appropriation provisions of the call shall be self-executing and shall constitute a first
claim on the state treasury.
Id.
137. GERALD A. MCB EATH, T HE ALASKA S TATE C ONSTITUTION: A R EFERENCE GUIDE 215
(1997).
138. Boucher v. Bomhoff, 495 P.2d 77, 78 (1972).
139. Id.; MCB EATH, supra note 137, at 215.
140. ILL. C ONST. art. XIV, § 1 (“ (b) If the question of whether a Convention should be called is
not submitted during any twenty-year period, the Secretary of State shall submit such question at the
general election in the twentieth year following the last submission.”).
141. See Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 403.
142. See MONT. C ONST. art. XIV, § 3. (“ Periodic Submission. If the question of holding a
convention is not otherwise submitted during any period of 20 years, it shall be submitted as provided
by law at the general election in the twentieth year following the last submission.”); LARRY M. ELISON
& F RITZ S NYDER, T HE MONTANA STATE C ONSTITUTION: A R EFERENCE GUIDE 206 (2001).
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Voters have rejected holding a convention under this provision in the two
times a call has issued, which it submits every 20 years. 143
Rhode Island included an automatic question provision in its
Constitution of 1973. 144 Interestingly, this provision was adopted despite
exceeding the substantive scope of the 1973 convention. The 1973
convention was convened as a limited convention to consider only certain
topics, and neither amendment procedures nor constitutional convention
calls were specified in its mandate. Two delegates to the convention,
William E. Powers and Prof. Patrick T. Conley, relied on a constituent
power theory to assert that the subject of convening future conventions
was within that convention’s power because the proposals would then be
submitted to the electors for approval. 145 The convention adopted an
automatic question provision that requires the secretary of state to submit
the convention question to the people if it has not been submitted at any
point during the prior ten years, and the people adopted this proposal. 146
Fourteen states continue to maintain these provisions. Five state
provisions call for a vote on the question every 10 years: Alaska, Hawaii,
Iowa, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. Eight state provisions call for a
vote every twenty years: Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri,
Montana, New York, Ohio, and Oklahoma. Finally, Michigan’s
Constitution calls for a vote on the question every 16 years.
IV. T HE ST AT E CONVENT ION DEBAT ES
I now proceed to flesh out the principle arguments in the many
constitutional conventions that have taken up the debate between
Jefferson and Madison and extended it on the floors of their convention
halls. 147 Striking themes emerge across these conventions. Many of the
143. Id.
144. R.I. C ONST. art. XIV, § 2 (“ If the question be not submitted to the people at some time
during any period of ten years, the secretary of state shall submit it at the next general election
following said period.”).
145. P ATRICK T. C ONLEY & R OBERT G. F LANDERS, JR., T HE R HODE ISLAND S TATE
C ONSTITUTION 34–35 (2007); T HE P ROCEEDINGS OF THE R HODE ISLAND C ONSTITUTIONAL
C ONVENTION OF 1973, App’x A (Conley, ed.) (1973) [hereinafter R HODE ISLAND 1973]. This issue
engendered litigation, with a delegate challenging the attempted restrictions on the convention’s
agenda. The Rhode Island Supreme Court later ruled the issue was moot because the convention did
not consider itself bound by the restrictions on its agenda and the convention had concluded. Malinou
v. Powers, 333 A.2d 420, 422 (R.I. 1975).
146. C ONLEY & F LANDERS, supra note 145.
147. First, an important note on the sources used in this endeavor. Although there have been 18
states that have, at certain points, included an automatic call provision in their constitutions,
unfortunately we lack sources that capture the debates of numerous constitutional conventions in
which such provisions were discussed and adopted. Many of the conventions choose not to record
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conventions witnessed discussion of the same fundamental issues that
Jefferson and Madison debated, for example: the paramount importance
of the central question; the tension between popular sovereignty and
constitutional precommitment; notions of constitutional stability; a
Madisonian fear of recourse to the people; and questions over how to
discern the people’s will, among other themes. Other convention
deliberations pressed beyond the debate between Jefferson and Madison
to consider novel issues of both theory and practice, such as: the
distinction between an automatic convention and automatic referendum;
the desire to obviate the interests of the legislature when making recourse
to the people; the pedagogical effects of recurring convention votes on the
general civic education; concerns over how to count the voting on a
referendum question; concerns over convention costs, and many other
issues.
Given the extensive scope of this comparative exercise, much of the
historical context of particular conventions and debates regrettably must
be left out. As such, this effort provides limited insight into the lives and
roles of the individual delegates, as well as the many personal biases and
interests they undoubtedly had. The goal here is merely to explore central
themes of these debates as they emerged in constitutional practice,
particularly those issues that attracted delegates at multiple different
conventions across the states and centuries. 148
their debates. Others prepared only journals, rather than transcripts of the proceedings. We do,
however, have useful sources for conventions in 12 of these states, namely: New Hampshire, New
York, Michigan, Maryland, Ohio, Iowa, Virginia, Hawaii, Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, and Rhode
Island. Professor Dinan provides a wonderful comprehensive record of the available sources for the
study of state constitutional conventions. See DINAN, supra note 11, at 279–85. Unfortunately, there
are not records of pivotal conventions discussing automatic call provisions for the following states:
Massachusetts, Kentucky, Indiana, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Alaska. Thus, the following discussion
of arguments from constitutional conventions derives from a review the records from numerous
constitutional conventions in these 12 states dating from the New Hampshire Convention of 1792,
through to the Rhode Island Convention of 1973. For a full breakdown of the conventions with
sources, see DINAN, supra note 11, at 279–85.
148. A further note on the sources. Given that much of the debate on this specific issue within
a convention is heavily situated within conversations among delegates on this and many other issues,
it is appropriate to be quite limited in my aims. Strains of argument concerning this issue were
interspersed in many discussions of other issues. Thus, I spent considerable effort attempting to isolate
thought on this particular issue, while still attempting to provide some context of the overall
discussion where pertinent. Laura J. Scalia, who reports doing work on the convention records,
describes the experience working with these sources particularly well:
[M]ost individual speeches are not as ideologically coherent as the presentation might
suggest. Rather than give prepared texts, delegates usually responded ad hoc to the views
and proposals offered daily on the floor. Speeches usually cannot be read in isolation, for
politicians were trying to speak to each other, to build upon the arguments of their
colleagues and counter the positions of their adversaries. Some offered detailed cases to
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I examine first a number of issues that were expressly considered by
either Jefferson, Madison, or both, and that were elaborated upon in the
state conventions. I next consider issues that piqued the interest of
convention delegates but were largely unexplored by Jefferson and
Madison. This division is loose and imprecise, as the concepts discussed
often relate and overlap. Nevertheless, some analytical distinctions must
be made, and I believe this organization helps to frame the discussion.
A.

The Jefferson–Madison Debate Embellished

Professor Dinan’s observation is correct that much of the debate that
occurred on the floors of these conventions was an extension of the
conversation between Jefferson and Madison. At least 6 of the major
themes that emerged across conventions speak to this fact, and I consider
them in the sections that follow. 149
1. The Importance of the Question
One issue on which almost every delegate appeared to agree across
the conventions was that the question whether to convene a convention to
alter the fundamental constitutional law was an issue of profound
importance. Many delegates across conventions explicitly stated that the
issue was one of the most important provisions of the respective
constitutions. 150
For example, in Iowa, one delegate framed the debate in these terms:
“I look upon this question as one of the most important that can come
before this Convention, involving, as it does, the rights of the people to a

support their points of view, but most of them selected bits and pieces of arguments already
given, echoing the conclusions of their more articulate peers. This means that expositions
were usually scattered and disorganized, not categorically broken into specific, disparate
themes . . . . To reproduce full speeches might give a fuller picture of how particular
individuals argued [on this issue under study,] but it would lead the reader in many
directions simultaneously.
S CALIA, supra note 9, at 20–21.
149. Of course, I cannot here discuss every single argument arising in conventions in each of
these states over the course of almost 200 years. I merely pursue the strains of argument I found to be
either fundamental, pervasive across conventions, or both.
150. See, e.g., T HE T HIRD C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF THE S TATE OF C ONNECTICUT:
P ROCEEDINGS [1965] 1087 (Hartford: Connecticut State Library, 1966) [hereinafter C ONNECTICUT
1965] (“ I sincerely hope that this very important Resolution will prevail in this Convention.”);
P ROCEEDINGS OF THE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF HAWAII , 1950, 768 (Honolulu: State of
Hawaii, 1961) [hereinafter HAWAII 1950] (“ The proposal for constitutional amendment, as I indicated
before, was one of the most important provisions of the Constitution.”).
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greater extent than any question that has been or can be presented here.”151
Similarly, a delegate to the Ohio Convention of 1873 noted that the
“important provision . . . is not a question of policy, but it is a fundamental
question, and goes to the foundation of government.” 152
For a New York delegate of 1846, the provision “asserted a great
principle that all power was inherent in the people and that once in 20
years they might take the matter into their own hands.” 153 Another New
Yorker in 1867 stated that “it is . . . a very grave question whether a
Convention shall be called, whether the Constitution shall be revised and
amended.” 154 Thus, many delegates considering the issue shared an
understanding of the gravity of the points under consideration. In doing
so, they exhibited a Jeffersonian perspective on the magnitude of the issue
and fulfilled Madison’s desire for the prospect to remain in the mind of
the philosophical representative. 155
2. Specific Reference to the Principle as Jeffersonian
In several of the conventions, delegates made specific reference to
Thomas Jefferson in connection with this principle. A delegate in the Ohio
Convention of 1873 explicitly tied the principle to Jefferson’s ideas,
stating that the automatic question provision:
is in accordance with the principle laid down by Mr. Jefferson in
discussing this question as to the right to bind future generations, and he
speaks of this as a necessary safety-valve, as established to prevent a
resort which has taken place, in some States, to revolution . . . . 156

Commenting on the amendment process more generally, a delegate to the
Hawaii Constitutional Convention of 1950 recalled that “Jefferson said a

151. 1 T HE DEBATES OF THE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF THE S TATE OF IOWA [1857]
604, W. Blair Lord, Reporter (Davenport: Luse, Lane, 1857) [hereinafter IOWA 1857].
152. See, e.g., 2 OFFICIAL R EPORT OF THE P ROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE T HIRD
C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF OHIO [1873] pt. 3, 2851 (Cleveland: W.S. Robison, 1873–74)
[hereinafter OHIO 1873].
153. DEBATES AND P ROCEEDINGS IN THE NEW YORK S TATE C ONVENTION FOR THE R EVISION
OF THE C ONSTITUTION, 1846, 794, reported by S. Croswell and R. Sutton (Albany: Office of the
Argus, 1846) [hereinafter DEBATES OF NEW YORK 1846].
154. P ROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF THE S TATE OF
NEW YORK HELD IN 1867 AND 1868, 3826, reported by Edward F. Underhill (Albany: Weed, Parsons
and Company, 1868) [hereinafter NEW YORK 1867].
155. Smith, supra note 27, at 652.
156. OHIO 1873, supra note 152, at 2846. Notably, it is unclear why merely an easy amendment
provision, rather than a periodic convention provision, would not suffice to alleviate the concerns o f
this delegate that posterity be bound too tightly.
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good many years ago ‘a revolution every twenty years is a good thing,’
and that’s still good political philosophy.” 157
A delegate to the Maryland Convention of 1967 not only invoked
Jefferson’s name in support of the automatic question provision in that
state, he also employed Jefferson’s methodology for attempting to
calculate the duration of the interval between votes, stating:
Thomas Jefferson has often been quoted on this floor, so I take the
liberty of citing him once more. It was the opinion of that great
statesman that the people should have a chance once every generation to
vote on their fundamental law. I have tried through the Maryland
Planning Commission to find out how long a generation lasts in the State
of Maryland. The nearest figure I can come to is nineteen years.158

Thus, in several conventions, the delegates exhibited their direct debt to
Jefferson as the father of the idea they were pursuing.
3. Popular Sovereignty & Progress
Pervasive across debates on the automatic question provisions in
many conventions was a robust notion of popular sovereignty as the font
of constitutional power. Many delegates agreed that “the constitutional
convention was the people’s function in government.” 159 A delegate to the
Maryland Convention of 1851 “regarded this as a most sacred right, and
desired a provision engrafted in the Constitution authorizing the people to
vote every ten years, as to the propriety of holding a convention.” 160
An Ohio delegate in 1850–51 was pleased that they had “cast off the
shackles of the past, when it was deemed unsafe to submit such questions
to the people.” 161 A delegate to the Iowa Convention of 1857 nicely
elaborated on this sentiment:

157. HAWAII 1950, supra note 150, at 762.
158. DEBATES OF THE [MARYLAND] C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF 1967–68, 2600
(Annapolis: Hall of Records Commission, 1982) [hereinafter MARYLAND 1967]. Not all delegates
were so infatuated with citations to the exalted name of Jefferson. Speaking in opposition to the
delegate cited in the text above, another Maryland delegate stated: “ I do not know who said it, I am
sure it was not Thomas Jefferson or Justice Holmes or anybody, but over home we have a saying,
even a blind hog can root out an acorn every once and a while.” Id. at 2601.
159. MONTANA C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION, 1971–1972: Verbatim Transcript 472
(Helena: Montana Legislature, 1981) [hereinafter MONTANA 1971].
160. DEBATES AND P ROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND R EFORM C ONVENTION TO R EVISE THE
S TATE C ONSTITUTION [1851] 360 (Annapolis: W. M’Neir, 1851) [hereinafter MARYLAND 1851].
161. 1 R EPORT OF THE DEBATES AND P ROCEEDINGS OF THE C ONVENTION FOR THE R EVISION
OF THE C ONSTITUTION OF THE S TATE OF OHIO, 1850–51, 435 J.V. Smith, Official Reporter to the
Convention (Columbus: S. Medary, 1851) [hereinafter 1 OHIO 1850].
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[I]f the people are safe to be trusted; if we act upon the principle that our
government is predicated upon the will of the people, and that our
sovereign power traced back to its source, rests upon the individual,
capable of self-government . . . I ask . . . where there can be a valid
objection to this provision in the constitution, to allow the people at any
time, upon the shortest notice, the privilege of altering the constitution
when they have found it to fail to meet their wants, or to cease to provide
for their interests? Can there be any objection to placing the question
directly before the people, and giving them the opportunity to make a
change? 162

This penchant to submit the issue to the people was often combined
with a sense of the overwhelming progress of mankind, and a need for the
fundamental law of the various states to accord with this progress. A New
York delegate in 1846 exhibited a Jeffersonian spirit of progress and lack
of “sanctimonious reverence” for the existing constitution, stating:
This was a day when Constitutions and long established principles were
being subjected to investigation and scrutiny by the people, and
gentleman who were so tenacious of holding on to doctrines that
prevailed half a century ago, would learn that there was a spirit of
intelligence and advancement abroad among the people, which must and
would be obeyed. And he was not willing to put his judgment against
the judgment of the sovereign people of his State. 163

A similar notion of progress arose in the Illinois Convention of 1969–
1970, as one delegate stated:
In this day of fast-moving changes in the state government to meet our
ever changing society, . . . it was our reassigning that the least we could
do was to offer an opportunity for the citizens of Illinois to be able to
decide if they saw a need for a Constitutional Convention every twenty
years, realizing that if the first twenty years there was no need, then
surely there would be a need in forty years, or at least every generation
or third or half we would have an opportunity to take another look at our
constitution . . . . 164

Thus, for some delegates, an overwhelming sense of progress in society
warranted recourse to the people in connection with a reconsideration of
162. 1 IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 608–09.
163. R EPORT OF THE DEBATES AND P ROCEEDINGS OF THE C ONVENTION FOR THE R EVISION OF
THE C ONSTITUTION OF THE S TATE OF NEW YORK, 1846, 245, reported by William G. Bishop and
William H. Attree (Albany: Office of the Evening Atlas, 1846) [hereinafter R EPORT OF NEW YORK
1846].
164. R ECORD OF P ROCEEDINGS: S IXTH ILLINOIS C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION, DECEMBER 8,
1969 TO MAY 21, 1970, at 478 (1972) [hereinafter, ILLINOIS 1969].
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the fundamental law, to examine whether it was fit for their times. The
next issue I consider, constitutional precommitment, is intimately
connected to these notions of popular sovereignty and progress.
4. Precommitment, the Binding of the People, & Stability
The central question of the Jefferson–Madison debate—may the
dead bind the living?—arose and invigorated debate at many conventions.
A Virginia delegate in 1901–02 explained that “[a] Constitution in its
nature, is an instrument which ties the hands of the people. The whole
object of a Constitution is for the people to take away from themselves
powers that they would otherwise have.” 165 Should the dead, then,
preemptively seize the power of the living and entrench constitutional
norms behind super-majority amendment thresholds?
A delegate to the Ohio Convention in 1850–1851 framed the issue of
precommitment in distinctly Jeffersonian terms, stating:
We are engaged in the creation of a government which is not only for
ourselves but which we proudly say is to be handed down to our
posterity to be a rule of action for them. Yet posterity have no hand in
making this government. They are not parties to the compact. They give
no assent to its provisions. Is it not justice then to declare that when we
deliver it into their hands, they shall have the privilege to say whether
or not they will be bound by it? . . . Believing in the doctrine, that free
government rests upon the voluntary consent of the governed, I hold that
it is the duty of every man, in framing the organic law, to leave it so
open to change, that it never can become anything else than the free,
voluntary consent of the people.166

Although this delegate did not expressly consider the notion of tacit
assent, he clearly evinced a desire that the consent of the people be free
and voluntary. Many delegates in favor of automatic question provisions
across conventions shared this Jeffersonian sentiment and reticence to
bind posterity too strictly. 167

165. 2 R EPORT OF THE P ROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION,
S TATE OF VIRGINIA JUNE 12, 1901 TO JUNE 26, 1902, at 2615 (Richmond: Hermitage Press, 1906)
[hereinafter VIRGINIA 1901–02].
166. 1 OHIO 1850, supra note 161 at 430–31.
167. See, e.g., OHIO 1873, supra note 152, at 2846 (discussing the “ fundamental principle . . .
which is sustained by authority, that every generation ought to govern itself; that we ought not to
undertake to make a government which should bind future generations in such a way that they could
not relieve themselves except through the mere machinery of existing government. There ought to be
some safety-valve in this matter . . . .”).
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Several of the delegates to certain conventions pressed the idea of
constitutional precommitment further than either Jefferson or Madison
had developed in their exchange. For example, one delegate to the New
York Convention of 1846 articulated the conception that making a
procedural precommitment to periodically reevaluate the constitution on
stated occasions would free the legislature from the consistent burden of
considering constitutional amendments. He noted that “[w]ithout this
provision, the legislature might be continually tormented with
applications to amend.” 168 Freeing the legislature of this burden by
providing for a periodic convention referendum would allow the
legislature to focus on its other responsibilities of sound policymaking.
To the contrary, however, many delegates across conventions
embraced Madison’s notion of the importance of stability in a
constitution. A delegate to the New York Convention of 1846 expressed
his concerns with frequent changes to the constitution that an automatic
question provision may engender, admitting: “that all power was inherent
in the people and the people could exercise their power through their
representatives; but changes should not be continually made. Love of
change was peculiar to man, but the public mind should be pervaded with
the necessity for change, before it should be acceded to.” 169
Similarly, a Montana delegate phrased his resistance to calling a
convention in a colorful simile: “Constitutional conventions should never
be held unless there’s a crying need demonstrated. It occurs to me that it
is something like a person taking castor oil every Friday at 9:00 p.m.
whether he needs it or not.” 170 A delegate to the Illinois Convention of
1969–1970 sounded purely Madisonian in stating that the automatic
question provision “[c]reates the possibility that a Convention could be
called every twenty years, and in so doing it creates a sense of instability.
I suggest to you that stability and the sense of stability is essential to a
sound constitution. I, therefore, feel that this provision is dangerous and
unnecessary.”171

168. DEBATES OF NEW YORK 1846, supra note 153, at 794. Stephen Holmes has articulated a
related idea on the notion of constitutional precommitment as liberating from the burdens of constant
lawmaking. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 8, at 228–30.
169. DEBATES OF NEW YORK 1846, supra note 153, at 794.
170. 3 MONTANA 1971, supra note 159, at 462. A similar argument appeared in the debates of
the French Constituant where the debuty Salle argued against having conventions at regular intervals,
stating: “ if they were declared to be periodical, they would believe themselves necessary by the very
fact of existing; they would want to act even when they have nothing to do; they would finish by
upsetting everything.” See JON ELSTER, S ECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE 182–83 (2013) (emphasis
added).
171. ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 489.
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Some delegates also raised the issue that it was easier to tear down
constitutions and institutions than it was to build them up. Terming the
proposed provision the “self-denying ordinance,” a delegate to the Ohio
Convention of 1850–1851 stated that “in early life, I learned that it was
easier to pull down than to build up; therefore I am disposed to be satisfied
with our institutions as long as they are endurable.” 172 Similarly, a
delegate to the Maryland Convention of 1851 was “prepared [to] endure
much political evil before [consenting to another convention].
Conventions . . . are beautiful to talk about for young and aspiring . . .
sweet in the mouth but bitter . . . in the belly.” 173
Not all delegates agreed with these stability-based objections. One
Montana delegate even argued that a recurring examination of the
constitution enhances stability, noting that “periodic consideration
strengthens rather than weakens a constitution and a government, as it
builds into the Constitution a remedy for changing times.” 174 Other
Jeffersonian voices of progress echoed through convention halls:
It is obvious that we are going to experience a very rapid growth in the
complexity of our society and the concomitant increasing involvement
and changing pattern of the relationship of government to society and it
is every more obvious that there needs to be a revision of our basic
structure of government to keep pace with that increasingly complex
society which will grow by geometric proportions, surely
disproportionately with the past. Therefore, our constitution probably
will not and should not last anything near a hundred years. As I said, it
is and should be a living document reflecting current feelings and
attitudes. It will not necessarily reflect those attitudes fifty years from
now. 175

This 1967 Maryland delegate’s idea of a living document reflecting
current attitudes is particularly striking. Thus, the tensions between
stability and progress identified by the Founders echoed through the halls
of the subsequent state conventions.
In addition to Madisonian notions of stability, some delegates
exhibited a Madisonian reticence to put the issue of a convention
repeatedly in the hands of the people. For example, an Ohio delegate in
the 1850–1851 Convention was concerned that “there are a great many

172.
173.
174.
175.

1 OHIO 1850, supra note 161, at 432.
MARYLAND 1851, supra note 160, at 365.
3 MONTANA 1971, supra note 159, at 462.
MARYLAND 1967, supra note 158, at 2601.
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other things you might have, that you do not now dream of, if you would
call a new convention and make another constitution.” 176
Others evinced more faith in the people. A New York delegate in
1867 argued for trusting the people with the decision: “we have no
apprehension that a Convention will, at any time, be called when in reality
there is no occasion for holding one; that the intelligent electors of the
state will not fail to properly settle that question whenever presented.”177
Similarly, an Ohio delegate in 1873 argued: “I do not see where is the
danger of intrusting to the people, under suitable limitation, the right to
say for themselves without legislative permission . . . .” 178 Another Ohio
delegate at the next convention in 1912 mocked attempts to “‘safeguard’
the people so that they can’t vote for what they want.” 179 Thus, an
exchange over whether or not to bind or to trust the people repeatedly with
this question arose at many of the conventions.
5. How Will the People Express their Desire?
A particularly interesting issue concerned how the people would
express their desire for a convention if there was not a periodic
referendum on the question. Jefferson raised the notion of the difficulty
of how to discern the will of the people in his 1816 letter, and issues over
how disparate individuals may exercise a corporate, collective sovereign
will of “the people” have long plagued political theory. 180 As a delegate
in Illinois phrased the issue: “If we don’t have a provision in the
constitution for the automatic placing of the issue . . . how would the
people express their desire if they have that desire to call a Constitutional
Convention from time to time?” 181 A delegate in the Iowa Convention of
1857, expressed a similar sentiment arguing that “[t]here must be an
authentic mode of ascertaining the public will, somehow and
somewhere. . . . I say that the will of the people must prevail, but that there
must be some mode of finding out that will.” 182 For many delegates, the
referendums precipitated by the mandatory question provisions were the
answer to discerning the people’s will.

176. 1 OHIO 1850, supra note 161, at 432.
177. 4 NEW YORK 1867, supra note 154, at 1858.
178. OHIO 1873, supra note 152, at 2847.
179. 2 P ROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF THE S TATE OF
OHIO, 1912, at 1913 (Columbus: F.J. Heer Printing, 1912) [hereinafter OHIO 1912].
180. See, e.g., JEAN JACQUES R OUSSEAU, T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACT (Johnathan Bennett ed.,
2017) (1762); Letter to Kercheval, supra note 26.
181. ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 487.
182. 1 IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 624.
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Others disagreed, believing the people could make their voices heard
sufficiently through representative democracy and the legislative
process. 183 A Maryland delegate in 1851 believed that “a legislative act
was necessary, in the future, to procure legal proof of the will of the
people . . . .” 184 A delegate in Ohio in 1850 asked a related question:
“Why . . . force upon the people, once in twenty years, the necessity of
voting on this question, when they do not ask it? The voice of the people,
when they require a revision of the organic law can be heard through their
representatives, and there is no danger that it will be unheard.” 185 In 1873,
another Ohio delegate expressed the principle: “I think you should not
disturb the fundamental law for slight reasons . . . if the people desire to
have a Constitutional Convention called, they can very readily elect a
Legislature with that view.” 186 Thus, whether the legislature was
sufficient to capture the will of the people on this issue or whether a
mandatory question provision was necessary, was a theme of debate
across conventions.
Delegates at some conventions raised the point that allowing people
to vote on whether or not to hold a convention would allow them to voice
an endorsement of the existing constitution through a “no” vote at the
periodic referendum. A delegate to the New York Convention of 1846
stated that the provision “was intended to give the people an opportunity
to endorse their Constitution once in every twenty years, if they were
satisfied with it; and if they were not, they might have it revised and
amended, by calling a convention.” 187 The automatic question could
institutionalize a means for the people to voice their satisfaction with the
current state of affairs. Madison would no doubt interpret the failure to
invoke the provision as assent to the current order.
6. What Is the Proper Interval Between Convention Referendums?
Although Jefferson maintained that “nature herself determined” the
proper interval for the recurrence of constitutional conventions, the
experience of the automatic question in practice raised some unanticipated
difficulties. 188 Indeed, the notion of a “generation” embraced by Jefferson
183. ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 487.
184. MARYLAND 1851, supra note 160. at 361.
185. 1 OHIO 1850, supra note 161, at 429.
186. OHIO 1873, supra note 152, at 2847.
187. R EPORT OF NEW YORK 1846, supra note 153, at 1038.
188. Interestingly, a study by Tom Ginsburg and Zach Elkins suggests Jefferson’s intuition may
be prescient. In their book, these scholars studied national constitutions over the past two centuries
and found that the average length of those constitution’s endurance was 18 years. T OM GINSBURG,
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is undoubtedly a fiction, as one generation obviously does not neatly
expire and pass the baton to the next. 189 Rather, “generations” bleed
together and overlap—one generation lives among both the previous and
the subsequent generations at any given time. What interval should
suffice, then? One delegate noted that there was no “magic number” but
thought that 20 years was sufficient “for political changes and their
relationship to the Constitution to be clearer,” while “a longer period may
breed dangerous stagnation into the body politic.” 190
A delegate to the Ohio Convention of 1850–1851 evinced a distinctly
Jeffersonian method of determining the interval: “We calculate that a
generation of men passes away about once in twenty years, and this
therefore is the period that has been fixed upon, for the laws of one to pass
into the hands of another.” 191 Another delegate at that convention thought
the 20-year period struck the appropriate mean, believing “that while the
ability to amend should be brought within the proper distance, it should
not be brought too near. Once in twenty years would be frequent
enough.” 192
Some intervals were a result of compromise. A member of the
drafting committee in the Michigan Convention of 1850 explained that as
the draft was being drawn up, “he found some members of the committee
in favor of ten years, and some favored twenty years. They thought it
better, however, to take a medium course and say fifteen years.” Not all
in the general assembly of that convention agreed. Arguing for a shorter
interval, a delegate wanted “to get at this constitution again in ten years,
if I should happen to live.” 193 Another delegate argued for a shorter period
due to his overwhelming sense of progress:
I think that ten years should be sufficient; for, within the last ten years,
such rapid improvement in mechanical arts, the scientific professions,
the mechanical telegraph, together with California coming into the
ZACH ELKINS & JAMES MELTON, T HE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL C ONSTITUTIONS (2009). Notably,
however, this study has been the subject of criticism, as the data appears over-inclusive, as they
included a substantial quantity of “ sham” constitutions.
189. Jefferson essentially admits as much when constructing the thought experiment. S MITH,
supra note 29, at 632 (“ To keep our ideas clear when applying them to a multitude, let us suppose a
whole generation of men to be born on the same day, to attain mature age on the same day, and to die
on the same day, leaving a succeeding generation in the moment of attaining their mature age all
together.”).
190. MONTANA 1971, supra note 159, at 463.
191. 2 OHIO 1850, supra note 161, at 430.
192. Id. at 436.
193. 1 R EPORT OF THE P ROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE C ONVENTION TO R EVISE THE
C ONSTITUTION OF THE S TATE OF MICHIGAN, 1850, at 466 (Lansing: R.W. Ingals, 1850) [hereinafter
MICHIGAN 1850].
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Union, &c., that in my opinion, this period would be best. And another
reason: because these things must necessarily, within the next ten years,
revolutionize not only this whole nation, but the entire world. I hold that
in the next ten years we are going to have an improvement much greater
than we have already had in the science of government and the condition
of society. I believe that fifteen years is too long . . . . I believe that we
shall have to alter it in five years, in view of the social revolution which
is about to take place throughout the civilized world. 194

Despite this forceful rhetoric, that convention ultimately settled on the
compromise of every 16 years, which is the interval at present. 195
A ten-year interval caused issues in Hawaii. The 1978 Hawaii
convention appears to have resulted in part because of this automatic
question provision but was not called under it. The text of the relevant
clause directed the lieutenant governor to place the question on the ballot
every ten years, but the 1978 general election was scheduled several days
prior to the elapse of the full ten-year period since the adoption of the 1968
Constitution. Based on a literal reading of the text, the attorney general
advised against asking the question, but the League of Women Voters
sued, resulting in the legislature agreeing to place the question on the
ballot. This uncertainty motivated the delegates to the 1978 convention to
specify a nine-year, rather than a ten-year period, in which the absence of
legislative action on the question would require the lieutenant governor to
place the question on the ballot at the election held in the tenth year after
voters had last considered the question. 196
In New Hampshire, the 7-year interval proved problematic when, in
1876, the state changed from annual to biennial elections for the
legislature “on the ground that it would be cheaper to have biennial
sessions than it was to have annual sessions.” 197 This change in the
frequency of voting on the legislature had the unintended effect of
preventing the automatic question from issuing on the constitutionally
decreed seven-year schedule, as the biennial general elections fell on
different years as the referendum question should have. As one delegate
to the 1918 Convention noted, the automatic question “part of the
Constitution has, by common consent and necessity, become a dead letter.

194. Id. at 466–67.
195. See MICH. C ONST. of 1850, art. 20, § 2.
196. ANNE F EDER LEE, T HE HAWAII S TATE C ONSTITUTION: A R EFERENCE GUIDE 200 (1993);
Task, supra note 135, at 308.
197. C ONVENTION TO R EVISE THE [NEW HAMPSHIRE] C ONSTITUTION, JUNE 1918, at 206
(Manchester: John B. Clarke, 1918) [hereinafter NEW HAMPSHIRE 1918]; MARSHALL, supra note 97,
at 17.
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The legislature, at times when it sees fit, takes the sense of the voters as
to whether there shall be a Convention called or not.” 198 In 1948, one
delegate proposed that the question “has to come on an even year and we
cannot use the seven-year interval any more; it has to be every eighth year
or some other even year.” 199 It was not until 1964, however, that the
provision was amended to require an automatic question every ten years,
where it stands today. 200 Thus, the proper length of the interval between
automatic calls proved to be an interesting issue in a number of the
conventions, both for theoretical questions over what constitutes a
generation, and practical issues of application to other constitutional
provisions.
B.

State Delegates Press Beyond the Jefferson–Madison Debate

The framing of the issue in the context of the conventions, as well as
the opportunity for extended consideration with the input of many
different sources, teased out many profound questions raised by this
concept, both theoretical and as applied, that did not emerge during the
Jefferson–Madison exchange. These concerns included different methods
by which to apply the Jeffersonian principle; whether it is desirable to
obviate the legislature when making recourse to the people; the effect on
civic education produced by considering the fundamental law; issues that
arose within conventions themselves due to the presence of an automatic
question provision in the constitution; how to count the votes cast in favor
of a convention; and other interesting considerations. I explore these and
other issues in the sections that follow.
1. Distinction Between Automatic Convention and Automatic
Referendum
One distinction teased out in the state processes that Jefferson and
Madison did not make express was a consideration of two forms of
implementing the Jeffersonian principle: a provision automatically
convening a convention and a provision providing for an automatic
referendum. Besides the original provisions in New Hampshire in 1784,
no state has since adopted an automatic convention provision.
198. Id. at 205.
199. JOURNAL OF THE C ONVENTION TO R EVISE THE [NEW HAMPSHIRE] C ONSTITUTION, MAY
1948, at 184 (Manchester: Granite State Press, 1948) [hereinafter NEW HAMPSHIRE 1948].
200. JOURNAL OF THE C ONVENTION TO R EVISE THE [NEW HAMPSHIRE] C ONSTITUTION, MAY
1964, 116 (Concord: Evans Printing, 1964) [hereinafter NEW HAMPSHIRE 1964]; N.H. C ONST., pt. 2,
art. 100.
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A proposal was, however, introduced in the Maryland Convention of
1967–1968 to require conventions to be held automatically at least once
every fifty years. 201 A delegate spoke in favor, noting that “it may be
desirable to impose an outside date at which a constitutional convention
must convene if none of the provisions provided for the calling of one
prior to that are utilized. . . . I submit fifty years is reasonable . . . .”202
Another delegate spoke out fervently against this provision as “defeating
the wishes of the people” because, “notwithstanding whatever the people
may do at this next general election approving or rejecting [a]
constitutional convention, that there shall be automatically a new
convention in fifty years, seems to me is putting a term ceiling on the life
of what we are doing here today.” 203 This argument won out and the
provision was defeated.
A delegate to the Illinois convention of 1969–1970 wanted to be
clear on this point: “I want simply to make sure that everybody
understands what this does. This does not—I repeat does not—provide
that we shall have a Constitutional Convention every 20 years. It does
only one thing: It provides that at least once every twenty years the people
of Illinois will be given the question [to vote on] . . . .” 204 Thus, discussion
in several conventions considered various applications of the Jeffersonian
principle, and virtually all adopted its more mild application in the form
of automatic question referendums, rather than automatic conventions.
2. Cost of Convention
The alleged exorbitant cost of holding conventions that these
provisions might inflict was a recurrent theme of objectors to automatic
question provisions. As a delegate to the Michigan Convention of 1867
stated, “I think it is unnecessary to have frequent revisions to the
Constitution. It is a very costly experiment.” 205 At the Ohio Convention
of 1912, a delegate stated that he did “not believe there is a necessity, or
ever will be, for another constitutional convention to cost the people of
this state $2,000,000, which will be the cost of this Convention by the

201. DINAN, supra note 11, at 59.
202. MARYLAND 1967, supra note 158, at 2595.
203. Id. at 2601.
204. ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 483.
205. 2 T HE DEBATES AND P ROCEEDINGS OF THE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF THE S TATE
OF MICHIGAN OFFICIAL R EPORT BY W M. B LAIR LORD AND DAVID W OLFE B ROWN 607 (1867)
(Lansing: John A. Kerr, Printers to the State) [hereinafter MICHIGAN 1867].
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time these proposals are submitted . . . .” 206 Delegates expressed similar
concerns at other conventions. 207
By contrast, in the New Hampshire Convention of 1964, one delegate
disagreed with the notion that Conventions were costly means of
amending. Arguing that amendments in the legislature could prove just as
costly, he stated:
It has been mentioned here . . . that there would be a substantial savings
in dollars, by giving up Conventions or by having fewer Conventions; I
cannot agree with that. . . . [Debates in the legislature] will be costly and
the costs will be hidden. We will not find it.” 208

That delegate further argued that the cost of printing and submitting the
legislature’s amendment proposals to the people piecemeal as they arose
would be more expensive than the conventional method of submitting
proposals all at once. Thus, the dual amendment method was too costly
and conventions were the economical choice. 209
Another delegate at that New Hampshire convention noted there
would be “some substantial savings involved if Constitutional
Conventions are called once every 10 years instead of once every 7 as
presently provided.” 210 Whether this reasoning was persuasive or not is
unclear, but New Hampshire did change the interval to 10 years at this
convention.
A delegate at the Illinois Convention of 1969–1970 had even
changed his mind on the desirability of the automatic question provision
in light of the expense and his experience, stating:
I have now come full-circle. Having gone through this experience—and
I use that word—I could use others—(laughter)—and having talked to
some of the delegates who have also gone through this and heard 100
years, I think perhaps the legislators were more wise than we perceive
in holding this experience from the people. You are talking now—I
guess we are going to spend some-where in the area of $10,000,000, one
way or the other, and it is not much if you say it fast. Now someone says
14,000,000; that isn’t even much if you say it fast. I am now of the
opinion that this matter should be left to the legislators. I am not sure
that I would ever vote for a Constitutional Convention again.211

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

OHIO 1912, supra note 179, at 1911.
See, e.g., MARYLAND 1967, supra note 158, at 2954.
NEW HAMPSHIRE 1964, supra note 200, at 113.
Id.
Id. at 110.
ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 3601–02.
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Thus, the cost of conventions due to an automatic call was a substantial
concern to some delegates.
3. Convention In the Hands of the Government or the People?
A central concern across many of the conventions was whether or
not to involve existing organs of government, most often the legislature,
in the process of convening a convention. This issue arose on two different
levels: first, whether there should be recourse to the people at all or
whether leaving the power of calling a convention with the legislature was
sufficient; and, second, whether the legislature should be involved in the
process once the automatic question provision was adopted. The earlier
Jefferson writings in Notes on the State of Virginia and Madison’s
Federalist 49 did touch on these ideas of recurrent recourse to the people
as a means of correcting abuses in government, but the second issue of
whether to involve the organs of government in the process of calling for
a vote or convening a convention was novel and widely discussed.
a. Trust the Legislature or Make Recourse to the People?
A major issue across conventions was the threshold question over
whether the people need be consulted at all with respect to holding a
constitutional convention, or whether leaving the power in the hands of
the legislature would suffice. Would the legislature call for a convention
when needed, even though legislators may have institutional or personal
interests against holding a convention? A delegate to the Montana
Convention of 1971–72 framed the question well:
It seems to me that you have one of two philosophies with regard to the
Constitutional Convention. One would put the emphasis on the
Legislature, and the other would put the emphasis on the people. . . .
Any effort in any way to put some other time or bring up some other
way the fact that the basic political right of the people is to call a
convention, I would resist very strongly. 212

Delegates at some conventions argued for the legislative approach.
These arguments largely advocated for placing trust in the legislature. In
response to the question, “Can I trust the legislature?” one Illinois delegate
stated: “Yessiree. That’s to coin a phrase. Our system [of government]
requires that under the separation of powers we trust each branch of
government almost entirely.” 213 An Iowa delegate at that state’s 1857
212.
213.

MONTANA 1971, supra note 159, at 472.
ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 501.
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convention framed the issue of the people’s role more bluntly: “If I
understand what democracy is—I mean American democracy—it is based
upon the constitution and the laws, and it does not wish to leave anything
for the people to do, when they are acting under the laws, that shall affect
the interests of the country. That is what I understand by American
democracy.”214
Other delegates remained skeptical of the legislative approach. 215
Another Iowa delegate thought that “[t]he legislature may have some
outside pressure, and may not represent the wishes of the people; or we
may have a governor who will veto a provision of that kind, and defeat
the wishes of the people.” 216 In Hawaii, a delegate pointed out that “if you
just leave it up to the legislature as it has been said, there is a possibility
that the legislature may not act for 20, 30 or 40 years.” 217 Similarly, in
Virginia, a delegate questioned: “Suppose a Legislature gets into power
in this State and willfully will not submit that question to the people when
the people demand it[?]” 218 I take up this issue in the next section.
b. Involve the Legislature in the Referendum and Convention
Process?
Can the legislature be trusted to put the referendum question on the
ballot as required by an automatic question provision? Can it be trusted to
convene and fund a convention if the people voted in the affirmative?219
Due to concerns over the legislature’s potential inaction on the issue,
many delegates sought to make the automatic question provisions “as selfexecuting as possible.” 220 Delegates across conventions expressed the
belief that a “[l]egislature should have nothing to do with calling a

214. 1 IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 625.
215. See, e.g., ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 478 (“Citizens of Illinois should not be deprived
of an opportunity to review periodically—every twenty years—an opportunity to rewrite their
constitution.”); 1 IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 605 (“ I hold that the people have an inherent right to
change their fundamental law at any time without their representatives or any other body interferi n g
with that right. . . . I favor the proposition that the people should have the right to amend their
constitution at any time, independent of the Legislature.”).
216. 1 IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 640.
217. HAWAII 1950, supra note 150, at 748.
218. VIRGINIA 1901–02, supra note 165, at 2623.
219. Madison had noted in Federalist 49 that an appeal to the people would likely come fro m
the executive or judiciary given that the “ tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement
of the legislative at the expense of the other departments.” T HE F EDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison).
220. HAWAII , 1950, supra note 150, at 747; see also John P. Wheeler, Jr., Changing the
Fundamental Law 58–59, in S ALIENT ISSUES OF C ONSTITUTIONAL R EVISION (W HEELER, JR., JOHN
P., ed., 1961).
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convention.” 221 A New York delegate in 1846 wanted “simply to bring
the constitution in review by the people once in twenty years, without the
intervention of any other body.” 222
On the federal level, this concern over state legislatures standing in
the way of the people’s invocation of their constituent power animated the
Founder’s construction of Article V of the United States Constitution. As
Professor Amar notes: “in order to avoid the danger that self-dealing state
legislatures might thwart needed reforms limiting their own powers or
shifting additional authority to the central government, Article V allowed
Congress to bypass these bodies in favor of special state ratifying
conventions.” 223 Concerning the federal legislature itself, Amar notes that
“in order to prevent a self-dealing Congress from simply bottling up
needed reforms that might limit its own powers, Article V offered an
alternative amendment-proposal system that would not depend on
congressional will.” 224 This alternative amendment-proposal system is the
ability to call a federal constitutional convention. Thus, state delegates
considering the automatic question as a means of obviating legislative
authority had federal precedent to look to.
Some delegates at state conventions observed a particular danger of
pernicious factional influences arising from the legislature and impacting
the will of the people. As a delegate to the Alaska Convention of 1955–
56 discussed: “history has shown . . . that when the time approaches that
the referendum is due . . . those that hold the actual political power . . .
will find ways and means of advising against it and in such a way
influence the otherwise free will of the people.” 225 An Ohio delegate in
1850–51 wanted to ensure the people had a means to declare their will
without appeal to a “cabal of interested politicians.” 226 At this Ohio
convention, there existed a shared sentiment among many delegates that
the automatic question was a useful means of combating the interests of
entrenched corruption in government. 227
While debating the automatic question in Iowa, delegates to the 1857
Convention addressed the issue of an actual instance of perceived
221. MARYLAND 1851, supra note 160, at 363.
222. DEBATES OF NEW YORK 1846, supra note 153, at 794.
223. AMAR I, supra note 23, at 290.
224. Id.
225. R ECORDS OF THE ALASKA C ONSTITUTIONAL C OVENTION OF 1956, at 1264–65,
http://www.akleg.gov/pdf/billfiles/ConstitutionalConvention/Proceedings/Proceedings%20%20Day%2044%20-%20January%2005%201956%20-%20Pages %201218-1320.pd f
[https://perma.cc/V8NT-DYPM].
226. 2 OHIO 1850, supra note 161, at 431.
227. See Id. at 432–33.
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legislative inaction. As one delegate stated, it was a “well known fact to
every individual who has been a resident of the State for that length of
time, that the people of this State have endeavored . . . to get a
constitutional convention called; and it is also a well known fact that, in
two instances, at least, the will of the people, as expressed repeatedly upon
this subject, has been thwarted through their representatives in the
legislature . . . .” 228 Here, the delegate is likely referencing the
“widespread,” prevalent discontent with the 1846 Iowa Constitution and
the lack of a convention call for years despite public pressure. 229 Thus,
some delegates at the 1857 Convention sought “to put some provision into
the constitution to prevent the legislature from assuming the right to
deprive the people of the right to say when and where and how they will
amend their constitution.” 230
One delegate warned that revolution could be the result of the
inability of the people to address perceived defects in the constitution.
Citing the then relatively recent unrest in Rhode Island, the delegate
stated:
I desire to have the question so shaped that the people can have a
Convention, without the Legislature having anything to do about it. I
wish to refer gentleman for a moment to the Rhode Island case, which
was carried up to the Supreme Court of the United States and there
decided. The question involved there was, whether the people, by any
means, could amend their constitutional law without the consent of the
Legislature unless they incorporated into the constitution in the first
place a provision giving them that right. It was decided by Judge Taney,
that there was no other way for the people to amend their Constitution
but by revolution, unless the right to amend it was reserved to them by
the Constitution itself. That principle carried out here will produce the
same result, unless we reserve that right to the people. 231

Here, the delegate referenced Dorr’s Rebellion, which was a violent
conflict between factions in Rhode Island arising due to the lack of
constitutional amendment provisions of its then-governing document, the
royal charter granted by King Charles II in the 1660s. 232 Political tensions
resulting from the governing charter’s unamendability lead to a political
228. IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 605.
229. S TARK, supra note 122, at 4.
230. IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 607.
231. Id. at 605.
232. See AMAR I, supra note 23, at 369–71. The struggle lead to a Supreme Court decision,
Luther v. Borden, in which Chief Justice Taney articulated the Court’s position that this was a political
question Congress both should and must determine to guarantee each State a republican government.
Id. at 370.
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and military struggle between two rival regimes each claiming to be the
lawful government of Rhode Island. 233
To prevent such a circumstance, a delegate argued that the people
should have the “right to reach the fundamental laws of their land without
being compelled to ask it as a privilege from the hands of any legislative
body.” 234 Further, “[u]nless we provide in the constitution some such
method as I have suggested, by which the people will retain the right to
amend the constitution without the consent of the legislature, there will be
no way to amend it unless they go through the legislative form for that
purpose, except by revolution, and they would then become amenable in
every effort to amend it, as they did in Rhode Island, to the charge of
treason.” 235 Another delegate was “willing to place to the greatest extent
the control of the fundamental law, the foundation of all the law of our
State, in the hands of the people, and independent of any power of the
legislature to control their will.” 236 Despite these sentiments, this Iowa
convention ultimately adopted a provision that relied on the legislature to
convene a convention if the people voted in the affirmative on the
question. 237
This issue was also widely discussed in connection with perceived
legislative inaction at the Hawaii Convention of 1959. Many delegates
wanted to ensure “that the thing is kept out of the hands of the legislature,”
because “people ought to have the opportunity, apart from the proviso
based on whether the legislature wants it or not, to vote on the question
periodically.” 238 That delegate elaborated on the point:
The language ought to be mandatory. It should not be left to the
legislature to authorize such State officer to act. . . . The legislature may
do nothing about it, and I think it should be mandatory that the
constitutional convention be called every so often. I think that with all
the changing times, it’s necessary that the people review their
Constitution every so often, and if we adopt that amendment, we won’t

233. See id.
234. IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 609.
235. Id. at 624.
236. Id. at 609.
237. See IOWA C ONST. of 1857, art. 10, § 3 (“ At the general election to be held in the year one
thousand eight hundred and seventy, and in each tenth year thereafter, and also at such times as the
General Assembly may, by law, provide, the question, “ Shall there be a Convention to revise the
Constitution, and amend the same? “ shall be decided by the electors qualified to vote for members
of the General Assembly; and in case a majority of the electors so qualified, voting at such election
for and against such proposition, shall decide in favor of a convention for such purpose, the General
Assembly, at its next session, shall provide by law for the election of delegates to such Convention.”).
238. HAWAII 1950, supra note 150, at 748.
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have that opportunity if the legislature will conduct itself as it has in the
past . . . .” 239

Further, a delegate sought to ensure “this provision is meant to be
self-executing. We don’t want any more situation where, as at present, for
50 years the legislature fails to do something that is supposed to be
done.” 240 This delegate referenced the fact that the Hawaii Convention
met among issues of reapportioning representation among the various
islands of Hawaii. There had been discontent over the state of
apportionment for years, as referenced, but some, particularly inhabitants
of outer islands, felt the legislature had not taken meaningful action to
address the grievances. 241 Keeping the automatic question out of the hands
of the legislature, then, may provide a remedy if such circumstances were
to develop on issues in the future.
Not all at this Hawaii Convention agreed that the legislature could
not be relied upon. One delegate noted that “the legislature, if it feels that
the question of revision or amendment to the Constitution is important
enough, that they cannot handle by the regular sessions of the
legislature . . . then they will take it upon themselves to prescribe the
method by which we will have a constitutional convention . . . .”242
Ultimately, however, the state adopted language that relied on the
lieutenant governor, rather than the legislature, to place the measure on
the ballot if there had not been a vote on the issue in the preceding 9
years. 243
A delegate to the Illinois Convention of 1969–70, cited the example
of Maryland’s legislature failing to put the vote on the ballot when the
people voted in the affirmative on the question, stating: “We know in
Maryland, where the question has been submitted to the people, the
legislature on two occasions failed to enact the enabling legislation for the
calling of the Convention; but we feel and would expect that our
legislature would abide by the people’s vote.” 244 This fear may have
proved persuasive, as Illinois adopted a provision requiring the Secretary
of State to submit the question to the people if it had not been submitted
within the prior twenty years. 245

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 748.
Id. at 749.
See, e.g., Trask, supra note 12, at 302–04.
HAWAII 1950, supra note 150, at 749.
See HAW . C ONST. of 1950, art. XVII, § 2.
ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 486.
ILL. C ONST. art. 14, § 1.
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There may also be a delay in the convening of a convention if left to
legislative action. A delegate to the New York Convention of 1894 noted
that “the Legislature and the Governnor were unable to agree as to the
method by which such Convention should be held. . .the selection of
delegates and . . .the time when it should be held and the result is. . .that
eight years have elapsed since the people declared that they wished [for]
a Convention.” 246 The people of the state had overwhelmingly voted in
favor of a convention in 1886, but one was not convened until 1894 due
to disputes between the legislature and governor. 247 Because of this delay
in convening the present convention, “[i]t has been deemed prudent to . . .
make the declaration of the people . . . self-executing.” 248 That convention
decided on language that empowered the electors of the state senate
district to elect delegates to a convention if approved by the people’s
vote. 249
Interestingly, and perhaps relatedly, none of the automatic call
provisions were adopted through the legislative amendment process in
any of these states. All but one were adopted in a constitutional
convention, with the exception of Missouri, which adopted its provision
by people’s initiative. 250
4. Pedagogical Effects on Civic Education
Delegates at some conventions emphasized that regular, recurring
consideration of the fundamental law would have salutary benefits on the
general level of public civic education. Regular reconsideration of the
constitution, whether or not change was deemed necessary, would connect
the people closer to the foundational principles of their order.

246. 2 R EVISED R ECORD OF THE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF THE S TATE OF NEW YORK
MAY 8, 1894 TO S EPTEMBER 29, 1894, at 7 (Albany: Argus Company, 1900) [hereinafter NEW YORK
1894].
247. See, e.g., R EPORT OF THE NEW YORK S TATE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION C OMMITTEE,
1938 (New York: Burland, 1938), at 369.
248. NEW YORK 1894, supra note 246, at 7.
249. See N.Y. C ONST. of 1894, art. XIV, § 2 (“ At the general election to be held in the year one
thousand nine hundred and sixteen, and every twentieth year thereafter, and also at such times as the
Legislature may by law provide, the question, “ Shall there be a convention to revise the Constitution
and amend the same?” shall be decided by the electors of the State; and in case a majority of the
electors voting thereon shall decide in favor of a convention for such purpose, the electors of every
senate district of the State, as then organized, shall elect three delegates at the next ensuing general
election at which members of the Assembly shall be chosen, and the electors of the State voting at the
same election shall elect fifteen delegates at large. The delegates so elected shall convene at the capitol
on the first Tuesday of April next ensuing after their election, and shall continue their session until
the business of such convention shall have been completed.”).
250. See Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 401.
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A delegate at the Montana Convention of 1971–72 advocated for an
automatic question provision as a way to combat both voter apathy and
ignorance of the substance of the constitution. He noted that there may be
a benefit for the people to, “generation after generation, take a hard,
questioning, political look at their Constitution—see if there is need for a
convention.” 251 This could combat the problem of “voter apathy” which
he thought was fostered by “taking a constitution and putting it on a shelf
for 90 years.” 252 The delegate continued:
Very few people in the state, I believe, today are aware of what the
present Constitution says, and I think that this method of bringing the
Constitution before the people will insure that this will not happen again.
And I think we want the people of our state to know what’s in the
Constitution; otherwise, there’s not much point in having a
constitution. 253

Thus, an automatic call provision might combat voter apathy, and foster
civic engagement and education.
Similarly, a delegate to the Ohio Convention of 1850–1851 was
convinced that:
the discussions which had led to the assembling of this body, and the
discussions which had attended their deliberations, were in every respect
desirable and advantageous to the people of the state, and that the
benefits of some discussion of the principles of the organic law, and of
the agitations attendant upon their discussion, should be given and
secured to every generation. He believed that the politics of Ohio would
attain a far higher grade in consequence of the discussions of this body,
than they would have attained by avoiding these agitations. . . . [S]uch
an appeal to the people, once in twenty years, would have a salutary
effect upon their public character. 254

Delegates at the Virginia Convention of 1901–02 expressed a
different view, claiming that when the question of whether to hold a
convention was submitted for a vote, “no attention has been paid to it by
the people.” 255 Thus, the drafting committee “determined to eliminate it
as absolutely useless and ineffective.” 256 The statements from this
convention, however, may not evince genuine beliefs about the provision.

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

MONTANA 1971, supra note 159, at 462.
Id.
Id.
2 OHIO 1850, supra note 161, at 430 (emphasis added).
VIRGINIA 1901–02, supra note 165, at 2613.
Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021

55

Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 4

384

AKRON LAW R EVIEW

[54:329

Such statements may merely veil an ulterior motive to restrict black
suffrage in the state, which was the prevailing sentiment at that convention
and infected the resulting constitution with democracy-restricting
provisions. 257
5. Issues within the Convention
A number of issues arose within several conventions that concerned
the automatic question provision’s effects on the work of that present
convention. Some delegates thought that the presence of automatic
question provisions in the constitutions would impact the work of the
convention then underway and may influence the delegates’ views
towards their own work. Other delegates raised issues concerning
attempts to limit the substantive issues a convention was permitted to
consider and the possibility of runaway conventions, as well as whether a
convention should be partisan or whether the delegates should be
independent of party affiliation. I address these issues in turn.
a. Considerations on the Work of Convention
In several conventions, delegates debated whether the automatic
question was necessary due to the perception that the constitution created
by that convention would endure perpetually. In the Michigan Convention
of 1867, a delegate stated: “I hope that when this convention has done its
duty, it will give everlasting cheer to the people of Michigan, by the
assurance that they will never have to be burdened again by a
constitutional convention.” 258 This sentiment has been identified as the
“pridefulness of framers.” Namely, their own belief in the quality of their

257. For example, such shameful rhetoric as the following, tinged with the Social Darwinism of
the period, occurred on the convention floor:
as sure as there is a God in heaven the African will have to go. The law of survival of the
fittest will prevail, and when competition will become fierce and sharp, the white man will
not only rule but will drive out the inferior race.
Virginia 1901–02, supra note 165, at 3146. Another person railed against the delegates “ who cannot
adopt a constitution without asking the consent of 146,000 negroes of Virginia, may go and do that if
you will. . . . I stand here in opposition to that and represent the whites.” Id. at 3201.
The issue of restricting constitutional amendment to disenfranchise minorities arose at other
conventions in the course of American history. For example, a delegate to the Rhode Island
Convention of 1973 recalled that in the 1843 Convention in the same state, “ the conservatives who
drafted the present Constitution, disenfranchised the Irish-Catholic immigrants to Rhode Island and
these nativists felt that the best way to make that discrimination stick was to make the amendment
process extremely difficult so that election revision could not take place easily and this downtrodden
group would be kept, in an inferior position.” R HODE ISLAND 1973, supra note 145, at 122.
258. 2 MICHIGAN 1867, supra note 205, at 607.
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own abilities such that the constitution arising from their work must be
good, and the future should not need to interfere with their excellent
handiwork. 259
Others at this convention disagreed, however: “Judging from the
past, we can hardly suppose that our work will be so perfect that it will
not need amendment or revision at some future time.” 260 Ultimately, that
convention produced a restrictive convention provision that eliminated the
automatic question, placed the ability to call a convention solely in the
hands of the legislature, and prevented any convention call prior to
1885. 261 That proposed constitution was rejected by the people of
Michigan, and they retained the 16-year automatic question in the 1850
Constitution. 262
The humility that won out in Michigan was present in other
conventions as well. In Ohio in 1873, a delegate maintained that “[w]e
ought not to go to work in this Convention as if we thought that in the
instrument we are getting up is contained all the wisdom in the universe,
and that wisdom was going to die with us.” 263 Similarly, in Maryland in
1967, a delegate stated: “I doubt that we are sufficiently wise and
visionary to create a document which will last forever or even a hundred
years as the current constitution has lasted. I think our constitution will
and should reflect the thoughts of our time. It should definitely be a living
document.” 264 Thus, while some delegates to certain conventions believed
in the perpetual endurance of the work then underway, a skeptical
humility over the duration of the resulting constitution was also present.
b. How the Question Affects the Work of the Current
Convention
Relatedly, some delegates were concerned that the presence of an
automatic question provision may lessen the quality of the present
convention’s work. Given that there was a possibility of revisiting in a
short time any difficult issues then under discussion, the automatic
259. See Jon Elster, Emotions in Constitution-Making: The 2016 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, 40
S CANDINAVIAN P OL. S TUD. 133, 147–48 (2017).
260. 2 MICHIGAN 1867, supra note 205, at 608.
261. Proposed MICH. C ONST. of 1873, art. XVIII, §2.
262. F INO, supra note 112, at 12.
263. OHIO 1873, supra note 152, at 2846–47.
264. MARYLAND 1967, supra note 158, at 10663; see also 2 ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at
3601 (“ We ought not to fall into the trap of assuming that we have a special brand of wisdom that
will transcend the ages. Believe me, we may make some mistakes here.”). These delegates did echo
Jefferson’s notion that “ it may be proved that no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a
perpetual law.” S MITH, supra note 29, at 634.
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question may incentivize agreement on less than optimal provisions or
agreement to “punt” difficult issues to the next convention. 265 A delegate
to the Illinois Convention of 1969–70 expressed this sentiment well: “I
have a certain nagging doubt about a possible effect of an automatic
proposition such as this on the Convention itself. . . . I wonder if a
Constitutional Convention, knowing that it’s very likely that their work
will be up for total review in twenty years, will pay quite so much attention
to avoiding the very topical treatment of subjects that got us into so much
trouble in 1870.” 266 Another delegate at that convention echoed his
concerns: “The more I listen to some of the testimony here this afternoon,
the more I am convinced that possibly we are not going to be
accomplishing as much at this Convention and that, because of the fact
that we’re thinking. . .that should be put off for a subsequent
convention.” 267
Some delegates expressed a further concern that including an
automatic question was a signal to the people that the convention itself
was unsure of the work it was submitting to the people. A delegate in Iowa
in 1857 thought that including the provision “is saying in substance to the
people, you are changeable, and what you do now you will want to undo
in ten years.” 268 An Illinois delegate had similar concerns: “if you have
the automatic call, I say to you what you are saying to the people is that
we are not sure about the proposals that we are giving them now. If we
are sure. . .we won’t go out and admit defeat from the start.” 269
This thinking did not affect all delegates, however. Many maintained
the objective of establishing a constitution for the foreseeable future. A
delegate in Iowa summarized this sentiment well:
I think it should be the object and pride of every delegate to a
constitutional convention, to form such a constitution as would stand the
test of time and secure the approval of the wisdom of ages. We do not
meet here to make a temporary law. Our object is to establish permanent
and fundamental laws. 270

Nevertheless, the automatic question provision raised salient issues over
its effect on the perspective and ambition of a constitutional convention
convened in a state with a commitment to this type of provision.
265.
nails.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

There is, of course, the opposite mechanism that may take effect: a hammer may look fo r
ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 486.
Id. at 491.
IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 623.
4 ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 3603.
IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 611.
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c. Powers of the Convention
Delegates across numerous conventions confronted the thorny issue
of whether a limited convention was possible. Could the constituent
power be limited by the mandate that convened the delegates, or by its
very nature were those seeking to exercise the constituent power free to
consider any substantive revisions? 271 A delegate to the Iowa Convention
of 1857 framed the issue:
[A]lthough a convention may be called together by the people with the
intention upon their part that the Constitution shall be amended only in
one or two particulars, you will find that when the Convention assembles
it will be judged necessary to make a general revision of the whole. You
will find that that has been the custom in all the states where conventions
have been called for the purpose of revising the Constitution.” 272

That was the custom, indeed, with the federal government, as the
Philadelphia Convention was convened merely to revise the Article of
Confederation.
A related issue arose in the New York Convention of 1867,
concerning whether the legislature could limit the time of the convention.
During that convention, it became clear that the delegates would not finish
their work in time to submit the proposed revisions to the voters at the
next November election, as required by the legislative act that enabled the
convention. 273 After citing the legislature’s duty to provide for the
election of delegates to a convention after the people voted in the
affirmative, a delegate stated:
[W]hen the delegates were elected by the people for the purpose of
revision and amendment of the Constitution, then they were clothed with
the power to do that duty. I have no doubt in my mind that that power
remains after the election day in November next. The Legislature had
no power to limit the time during which we should act. 274

That convention did not conclude until February 1868, and the draft of the
constitution was discussed in the legislature for another year before being
rejected by voters in 1869. 275 New Yorkers remedied questions over this
issue by expressly stipulating in the automatic call provision that a
271. For examples on both sides of this question in other constitution-making contexts, see
ELSTER, supra note 170 at 194–95.
272. IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 610.
273. R EPORT OF THE NEW YORK S TATE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION C OMMITTEE, 1938
(New York: Burland Printing Co., 1938), at 369.
274. 3 NEW YORK 1867, supra note 154, at 1965.
275. P ETER J. GALIE, T HE NEW YORK S TATE C ONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 280 (1990).
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convention continued “until the business of such convention shall have
been completed.” 276 Thus, question of the extent of the constituent power
once convened raised a concern for many delegates considering this issue.
d. Concerns Whether a Convention Should Be Partisan
Should a constitutional convention convened under the automatic
question be organized by political parties? Or should the delegates be
independent of party affiliation? This issue arose at the Illinois convention
of 1969–70. One delegate was concerned over the prospect of partisanship
in a party-affiliated convention:
I submit that the only way to produce a constitution that is worth
submitting and worth adopting is if you have delegates who do not owe
their principal allegiance to any party organization, no matter how much
in the public interest that party may be. And I submit that both parties
try to act in the public interest. We ought to have at a Convention people
who do not have special partisan commitments.277

Another delegate to that convention invoked star power to address the
same concerns, noting: “Senator Robert Kennedy, when he addressed the
ill-fated 1968 New York Constitutional Convention, said on its opening
day that there is a place for partisanship and special interests, but that
place is not in a Constitutional Convention.” 278 The current Missouri
provision specifies that “[t]he question shall be submitted on a separate
ballot without party designation.” 279
This debate raises interesting issues echoing Madison’s concern over
factions arising, but considering the question from a particular
perspective. Would a partisan convention consider issues that a nonpartisan convention would not, or decide the same issues in a different
way due to partisan interests? Should an invocation of the people’s
constituent power be constructed in an overtly partisan way, with the
representative relationship to party and only a faction of the constituency,
rather than all the people? On the contrary, perhaps a partisan organization
would better represent the constituents in their diversity and interests.
These fascinating considerations arose in the context of contemplating the
conventions that might arise from the automatic question.

276.
277.
278.
279.

N.Y. C ONST., art. XIX, § 2.
4 ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 3608.
Id. at 3610.
MO. C ONST. art. XII, § 3(a).
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6. Effect on the Legislature
Some convention delegates discussed fears over the impact that an
automatic question provision might have on the work of the legislature in
the future. Such provisions may reduce the incentive for a legislature to
take up politically difficult or divisive questions when they could simply
leave the issue to a pending constitutional convention vote that may be
scheduled in a few short years. The Illinois convention of 1969–70
provides a good example of an exchange on this point, as a delegate gave
voice to this concern:
We ought to take a very serious look at this provision, because I now
feel that it very well may be rushing us forward into the past. I feel that
there can be something very inhibitive about the proposal. I think there
is something that can be stifling of the legislature . . . something that will
impinge upon that willingness of the legislature to take hold of a bite
and to digest it and to come up with what they believe is right.280

In response, however, another delegate disagreed: “[I]t has had the
effect on the legislature we earnestly hope ours will, which is to stimulate
legislative action. So, it is part of our philosophy that having this
provision . . . will perhaps stimulate the legislature to take action on
constitutional change, submit questions to the people themselves, and
thereby eliminate the need for a constitutional convention.” 281 The
convention ultimately sided with the arguments in favor and adopted the
automatic question, but considerations over its potential effects on the
legislature raise interesting points.
7. Voting Concerns
One voting issue arising as a concern in some conventions was
whether it was inadvisable to hold the vote on a constitutional convention
when other significant votes were scheduled. For example, in the New
York Convention of 1867, one delegate introduced a motion to change the
year of the next automatic question so that the vote was not “in the same
year with the presidential election,” reasoning that “we have seen enough
of Conventions sitting during intense political contests.” 282 A delegate in
280. ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 484.
281. Id. at 485. A contemporary commentator has also arrived at this view: “ the prospect of a
convention vote may encourage legislators, as a matter of self-preservation, to address citizen
concerns that could lead them to endorse a convention, lest a new constitution diminish legislative
powers and prerogatives.” Robert F. Williams, Evolving State Constitutional Processes of Adoption,
Revision, and Amendment: The Path Ahead, 69 ARK. L. R EV. 553, 569–70 (2016).
282. 4 NEW YORK 1867, supra note 154, at 2813–14.
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the New York Convention of 1915 was also conscious of this issue, noting
that the year for the next automatic question “ought to be 1935; 1936 will
be a Presidential year.” 283
A second major issue that surfaced across a number of conventions
was how to count the voting on the automatic question referendums.
Would a majority of those voting on the question suffice to call a
convention? Or should a state require a majority of those voting in the
election, for example, for governor, rather than a majority of the votes cast
solely on the question of whether to hold a convention? As noted above,
this question caused issues in Maryland when the people twice voted in a
majority on the question, but not the election generally, and the legislature
did not convene a convention.
Also, many states observed the phenomenon of “ballot falloff,”
where the number of votes cast on the constitutional convention question
was far less than the number of votes cast on other races higher up the
ballot. 284 Given this phenomenon, how should the votes be counted? Here,
the question of Madison’s notion of tacit assent is particularly interesting.
May those that did not vote on the question be deemed to have provided
assent to the existing state of affairs? The epistemic problem of discerning
their intent is particularly salient. A delegate to the Ohio Convention of
1850 believed that “[i]f the people do not need a revision of their organic
law, all they have to do is not to vote for it. To refrain from voting is to
vote in the negative. This process involves no trouble, and not a cent of
expense.” 285 But can that assent be assumed of all those failing to vote on
the question?
This issue was the subject of extensive rhetoric in the New York
Convention of 1867. Arguing for counting the majority of those voting in
the election, a delegate questioned: “shall we allow a small fragmentary
vote to control? Shall five thousand votes control the question, if there are
no more cast, when there are probably nine hundred thousand voters in
the State?” 286 He continued, noting concern about the effect of passion on
a small minority:
We are assembled in extraordinary times, when, as I have said, the world
appears to be infatuated. Without conventions nothing can be done. . . .
[A]nd I consider it would be wise in us to retain all the barriers regarding
and restraining these calls, that the framers of the instrument, under
283. 3 R EVISED R ECORD OF THE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF THE S TATE OF NEW
APRIL SIXTH TO SEPTEMBER TENTH 1915, 3310 (Albany: J. B. Lyon Company, 1916).
284.
285.
286.

YORK,

See, e.g., F INO, supra note 112, at 22.
2 OHIO 1850, supra note 161, at 430.
4 NEW YORK 1867, supra note 154, at 2813.
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which we have lived for twenty years, meant should exist. . . . Some
excitement may sweep over them . . . temperance, spiritualism or
Fenianism, or secession, if you please, which latter I fervently hope we
may never see again; and in the excitement of an election the whole
question of the Convention would be lost sight of. I think this guard
which has been suggested is necessary: that the vote upon the question
should be at least equal to a moiety of the vote taken at the same time
for the office of Governor . . . . 287

Other delegates at this convention opposed this position, arguing that
counting a majority of those voting in the election, rather than on the
question, unfairly diluted the power of the vote for those who actually
engaged with the question. One delegate stated:
We are in the habit, under our American system, of determining
questions by votes and not by silence. I think the practice which has been
introduced in another section of the country, of determining great
questions by staying at home and refusing to vote, should not beadopted
here at the North in a Constitution, and as a permanent principle of our
constitutional system. . . . [Those votes] should have no weight or
influence in the decision of the question. 288

Another delegate agreed, arguing that “if there are some so indifferent, so
ignorant, so delinquent in the discharge of great public duties, the highest
duties of citizenship, as to stay away from the polls on that question, their
silence should have no influence upon the decision.” 289 These arguments
won out, as the constitution proposed by the 1867 New York Convention
ultimately counted the majority of those voting on the question for the
holding of a convention. Nevertheless, the entire proposed constitution
was rejected by the people. 290
This issue also raised Madisonian concerns of stability for several
delegates across conventions. A delegate to the Maryland Convention of
1867 was concerned over the effects of a small minority of the population
successfully voting to convene a convention: “If at that election only onetenth of the people voting at the election vote on that issue, if a bare
majority votes on the issue, they can call a constitutional convention.
Rather than having stability and good government, you are adding
instability.” 291

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

4 NEW YORK 1867, supra note 154, at 2812–13.
5 NEW YORK 1867, supra note 154, at 3826.
Id.
Id. at 3944.
MARYLAND 1967, supra note 158, at 3147.
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One delegate at the New York Convention of 1867 elaborated more
fervently on that point:
Stability in our Constitution and laws is of the greatest consequence for
the interests of the community. No Convention should be called for the
purpose of revising the Constitution, that is, for the purpose of making
corrections generally, unless upon the most deliberate and full decision
of the people on the question. It is very evident that if the minority of
the people only vote upon that question there cannot be such serious
evils to be remedied as to require a Convention. For these reasons I have
been compelled to dissent from the report of the majority of the
committee and to recommend the retention of the present provisions of
the Constitution on the subject construed as I have explained. 292

Another delegate to that same convention, however, held a different
opinion:
As to requiring a majority of all who vote for officers . . . it is believed
that such a requirement would in many, and might in all cases defeat the
calling of a convention altogether. Many causes might operate to
diminish the vote on that question, irrespective of the merits of the
question or the wishes of the people, and it will be found by reference
to similar elections, that a much smaller vote has been cast upon such
questions than for candidates for the public offices voted for at the same
election. 293

Still another delegate to that convention held that “those who neglect their
duty—in my judgment, their moral obligation—of voting on a great
public issue, should be concluded by the votes of those who do not neglect
their duty. That is a general principle of republican government.” 294
In the Iowa Convention of 1857, one delegate speaking in favor of
counting the majority of those voting at the election, rather than on the
question, stated that “I think there is more danger in having conventions
than in not having them. . . . If they lose their convention once on account
of this carelessness, they will be likely to be more careful the next
time.” 295 Further, if voters are careless, “then it shows that they were
indifferent, and that there was no great public demand for a
convention.” 296 Another delegate thought that “we ought not to provide
for the calling of a convention by a minority of the voters of the state.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

2 NEW YORK 1867, supra note 154, at 1351.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1351.
2 IOWA 1857, supra note 151, at 1031.
Id. at 1031.
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Such a course is not exactly in accordance with my ideas of
democracy.”297 These arguments won out, and this convention adopted a
provision that required a majority of those voting in the election
generally. 298 As noted above, this question caused issues in Maryland
when the people twice voted in a majority on the question, but not the
election generally, and the legislature did not convene a convention.
Of the 14 states that currently have automatic question provisions 12
count the majority of those voting on the question to be sufficient. 299 Only
Maryland still counts the majority of those voting in the election, rather
than on the question. 300 Illinois provides two thresholds, requiring a
convention be called “if approved by three-fifths of those voting on the
question or a majority of those voting in the election.” 301
8. Effect of the Automatic Question Provision on Other
Amendment Provisions
At times, the automatic question was considered in conjunction with
other provisions of the amendment process. In some conventions, the
automatic question was adopted as a compromise between those who
wanted the highly democratic method of amendment by initiative and
those who favored a more conservative amendment approach. For
example, a delegate from the Hawaii convention noted that “since we have
voted against the initiative method of proposing amendments to the
constitution, we felt that this was a good concession to the people in
general.” 302 A delegate in Illinois was blunter: “I for one am scared to
death of the initiative procedure and would much prefer this automatic
vote.” 303 Such a compromise also occurred in the Michigan Convention
of 1907. 304
In the Montana Convention of 1971–72, a member of the committee
that drafted the provision explained to the general assembly that the
“rationale is that the people of Montana do not now have the power to call
a convention by the initiative. The committee feels that this is a basic
297. Id. at 1032.
298. See IOWA C ONST. art X, § 3.
299. ALASKA C ONST. art XII, § 3; C ONN. C ONST., art. XIII, § 2; IOWA C ONST. art X, § 3; HAW.
C ONST., art. XVII, § 2; MICH. C ONST., art. XII, § 3; MO. C ONST. art. XII, § 3(a); MONT. C ONST. art.
XIV, § 4; N.H. C ONST. pt. 2, art. 100; N.Y. C ONST. of 1894, art. XIV, § 2; OHIO C ONST. art. XVI, § 3;
OKLA. C ONST. art. XXIV, § 2; R.I. C ONST. art. XIV, § 2.
300. MD. C ONST. art. XIV, § 2.
301. ILL. C ONST., art. XIV, § 1(c).
302. HAWAII 1950, supra note 150, at 748.
303. ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 489.
304. F INO, supra note 112, at 1442.
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political right of the people under a government like Montana’s.”305 The
automatic question provision was, in their view, a means to
institutionalize that right.
9. Preempt Questions Over the Legitimacy of the Constituent
Body
In several states, the constitution did not provide for the convening
of a convention. Despite the fact that the notion of the constituent power
vested in the people was a widely accepted fundamental principle of
popular sovereignty in America by the end of the 18th century, 306 several
of the state conventions that convened without a preexisting constitutional
provision providing for them faced some questions of their legitimacy. An
explicit provision for the convening of a constitutional convention in the
future was a remedy to prevent this conundrum. Consideration of an
automatic question provision were integral to this discussion in a number
of the conventions.
In Connecticut, a delegate thought “this Resolution . . . does fill a
notable lack or hole, if you will in our present Constitution. This
Convention was itself called midst some comment as to the authority by
which it could be brought into being. Our present Constitution as we all
know is silent on this subject. The Resolution not only will overcome that
deficiency, but will make quite precise the method by which and in
general a time schedule on which such Cons may be called.” 307
In New York, a delegate reflected on questions of legitimacy
surrounding a prior New York Convention of 1821:
[I]t has been gravely insisted that the Convention of 1821 was an
unauthorized and an unconstitutional body, and that the work of its
hands derived its authority solely from the subsequent action of the
people, in adopting and ratifying its proceedings, and by general
acquiescence therein; the right of revolution successfully carried into
effect. It is not the purpose of the committee to enter upon any discussion
of such question in this report, but desire to prevent their recurrence in
the future. . . . While such questions are, undoubtedly, more theoretical
than practical or useful, your committee are well sati[s]fied that the

305. 3 MONTANA 1971, supra note 159, at 456.
306. See, e.g., GORDON W OOD, T HE C REATION OF THE AMERICAN R EPUBLIC 1776–1787, 306–
343 (1998).
307. C ONNECTICUT 1965, supra note 150, at 1087–88.
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provisions in the Constitution of 1846, both for amendment and revision,
are wise and salutary, and ought to be substantially retained.308

Of course, an automatic question provision is only one manner of ensuring
the constitution gives positive shape to the latent ability of the people to
convene a convention. A constitution may merely articulate that the
people or the legislature may vote to convene one at any time.
Nevertheless, these provisions were discussed as a means of alleviating
those criticisms.
10. Conventions Look to Other State Practice
Convention delegates often looked to other state practice on the
automatic question issue, which Jefferson and Madison did not discuss.
To be fair, Jefferson and Madison had only Massachusetts and New
Hampshire as possible sources of investigation on the question, 309 and
those states had only implemented but not exercised the provision at the
time of the Jefferson–Madison exchange. Given Madison’s practical
objections to the idea, however, examining other state practice on the
issue is a rich source of information that many of the convention delegates
utilized.
For example, in the Ohio Convention of 1873, a delegate remarked
“that the provision that has been thus widely copied from the Constitution
of New York of 1846, which was originally obtained from the New
Hampshire Constitution, should not be disturbed.” 310 A delegate at the
Illinois convention of 1969–70 noted that twelve states then utilized such
a provision and that there is “much evidence this type of procedure has
been satisfactorily used in other states.” 311
A delegate at the Connecticut convention pointed to the “Model State
Constitution,” which contained an automatic question provision. 312 The
Model State Constitution was a document developed by the National Civil
League 313 that purported to present “an ideal of the structure and contents

308. 2 NEW YORK 1867, supra note 154, at 1349–50.
309. The related institution of the Pennsylvania Council of Censors under the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 may also have provided a source of inspiration. That constitution convened a
body, the Council of Censors, every seven years to review the constitutionality of laws.
310. OHIO 1873, supra note 152, at 2846.
311. ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 478.
312. C ONNECTICUT 1965, supra note 150, at 815.
313. Formerly, the National Municipal League, as founded in 1894. See, e.g., NATIONAL C IVIC
LEAGUE, https://www.nationalcivicleague.org/ [https://perma.cc/D43R-HZ69].
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of a state constitution.” 314 Thus, it is noteworthy that this document
contained an automatic question provision.
Delegates arguing against the provision counted the small number of
states adopting automatic call provisions and pointed to some states that
had rejected it. For example, a 1969 Illinois delegate stated: “[O]nly ten
states . . . have it. In the same fifty years, four of the states who have held
Conventions have rejected it. . . . New Jersey rejected it.” 315 Thus, the
issue of other state practice factored into both sides of the debate over
whether to adopt an automatic question provision.
11. The Issue of Revision Commissions
Another important question arising in several states that impacted the
automatic question debate was whether there should be a constitutional
revision commission “to investigate and determine what methods could
be followed to effect constitutional reform” and provide advice to a
convention. 316 Constitutional revision commissions generally took the
form of a body appointed to study the constitution and provide a report on
its findings of potential defects or improvements that might be made. The
question of a commission for constitutional revision has recurred in
several states and is a broader debate than on merely the issues considered
here. The question did, however, impact the automatic question debates,
particularly with respect to providing guidance to a convention and
increasing the cost of the convention process.
A delegate at the Montana Convention of 1873 believed that “if the
state is going to vote on the question of a constitutional convention, they
should have this commission appointed, who should study and who
should act and should make recommendations.” 317 Another delegate
thought that “without [a constitutional revision commission], a
constitutional convention could prove to be a waste of money.” 318 Some
resisted a commission, noting that its findings “could very well stifle the
initiative of a group of people who felt very seriously and very strongly
about calling a constitutional convention.” 319 A delegate to the New York
Convention of 1867 even proposed using a commission to generate
proposed revisions to the constitution instead of a convention to save
314. See, e.g., Connecticut 1965, supra note 150, at 815; ANN B OWMAN & R ICHARD KEARNEY,
S TATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 63 (2011).
315. ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 164, at 484.
316. 3 MONTANA 1971, supra note 159, at 456.
317. Id. at 458.
318. Id. at 460.
319. Id. at 459.
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money. 320 This idea was not adopted in its full form, but New York does
utilize a committee to generate a report prior to holding conventions. 321
Thus, the issue of revision commissions had repercussions for the
automatic question debate in several states.
V. CONCLUSION
As we see, the state convention debates over the Jeffersonian
principle of recurrent recourse to the people at regular, periodic intervals
raised many novel issues and have much to teach us. In addition to
expressing the Jeffersonian spirit of progress and Madisonian notions of
stability, delegates debated issues like the effect of an automatic question
on the perspective of the current convention, or the legislature thereafter.
They considered the effects of the provision on the quality of public civic
education and debated how to count the votes on the issue. These are
merely some of the themes that emerged at constitutional conventions
discussing this fundamental issue, demonstrating how much these rich
resources have to teach us if we only look.
What do we make of the curious phenomenon that these several
states have rejected Madison’s strong arguments in favor of Jefferson’s?
Furthermore, what do we make of the fact that recent votes under these
provisions have been overwhelmingly against holding conventions?
Such provisions have led to more than 25 constitutional conventions
over the 237 years of their existence, but votes to hold conventions have
cooled in recent years. 322 The last convention held under the affirmative
vote from an automatic question was in Rhode Island in 1986. All
submissions of the question since then have resulted in negative votes for
each state that held a referendum under the provisions, including New
York voters rejecting a convention in 2017. 323 Does this represent
satisfaction with the status quo, worry over the prospects of a convention,
or something else entirely? Does it show that Madison’s fears are
overblown and that the people may be trusted with this responsibility?

320.
321.

NEW YORK 1867 supra note 154, at 25.
R EPORT AND R ECOMMENDATIONS C ONCERNING T HE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
P REPARATORY S TATE C OMMISSION ON A C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION ADOPTED BY THE
C OMMITTEE ON THE NEW YORK S TATE C ONSTITUTION, 2015, https://www.nysba.org/
NYSConstitutionReport/ [https://perma.cc/8QTJ-NF8J].
322. Dinan, supra note 11, 71 MONT. L. R EV. at 403.
323. See id. at 403–05; Gerald Benjamin, The Mandatory Constitutional Convention Question
Referendum: The New York Experience in National Context, 65 ALBANY L. R EV. 1017, 1019–20
(2002); Martineau, supra note 11, at 424 & n.14, 439-46.
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In a broader sense, are these provisions desirable? Should Jefferson’s
optimism triumph or are Madison’s concerns more sound? There may not
be a universally applicable answer to these questions.
Perhaps the automatic question is more apt in some constitutional
contexts than in others. For example, federalism may provide a stable
foundation against which to invoke such a provision. Perhaps the steady
backdrop of a perpetual national constitution is the appropriate framework
for the states then to implement the automatic question. Indeed, Madison’s
stability concern is genuine and profound. What of the danger that an
automatic question is issued and a convention approved in a time of high
political passion and strife? Then again, constitutional conventions are
often held in times of high passion, which seems to have been a necessary
precondition politically to convene a convention in many historical
contexts. 324 Perhaps a procedural precommitment to regular periodic
convention questions may provide the opportunity to hold conventions
when passions are not as high as they otherwise would be and in which
public reason prevails. 325
Moreover, applying the Jeffersonian principle on the national level
raises many deep issues, as Madison pointed out. Madison’s notion of the
problem of factions in a convention is particularly salient in the current
political climate. There are also the problems of reaching compromise on
difficult issues, bolstered by the tenuous nature of the original
compromise at Philadelphia. 326 Ultimately, it is important to note that only
14 of 50 states, just over one-quarter, adopt the automatic question
approach. Thus, the majority reject it.
Returning to Professor Levinson’s embrace of the Jeffersonian
principle and call for a constitutional convention: in the current political
climate, it would seem to result in disaster. There is certainly no prevailing
sentiment of bipartisan statesmanship, the quality of public discourse is
pitiful, and factional interests consistently squelch public reason. This
vindicates the Madisonian view that the events of 1787–89 were a
profound historical convergence of unique individuals and forces,
unlikely to happen often or even ever again. 327

324. See, e.g., ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 8, at 159.
325. Of course, passions must be sufficiently high for an affirmative vote on an automatic
question, but need not be if a polity commits to an automatic convention provision.
326. See, e.g., AMAR I, supra note 23, at 296–99.
327. Of course, Jefferson criticized this notion, admonishing us not to “ weakly believe that one
generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs.” Letter
to Kercheval, supra note 28.
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Troublingly, Levinson’s response to the present state of affairs
appears to be to consider a breakup of the Union. 328 Perhaps, however, the
answer lies within our existing American constitutional framework and
tradition, with a federalist blend of the Madisonian and Jefferson models.
Perhaps a solution may be found in a more fervent emphasis on
constitutional federalism, with the Madisonian stability the national
government provides offering a firm backdrop against which more
localized states may embrace all their particularities and preferences in
Jeffersonian experiments. A renewed focus on constitutionalism within
states and closer to the people with their divergent local interests may be
able to accommodate the strain those differing cultural and normative
tendencies inflict on politics at the federal level. This is a point for further
theorizing.
One point, however, is sufficiently clear: the question over whether
to adopt a principle of regular, periodic referenda on constitutional
conventions is an important one with which constituent assemblies must
grapple. On this question, Jefferson, Madison, and the state constitutional
tradition have much to teach us.

328. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The 21st Century Rediscovery of Nullification and Secession
in American Political Rhetoric: Frivolousness Incarnate, or Serious Arguments to Be Wrestled With,
in NULLIFICATION AND S ECESSION IN MODERN C ONSTITUTIONAL T HOUGHT (ed., LEVINSON) (2016).
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